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THE PICK-AND-SHOVEL PLAY: BIOETHICS 
FOR GENE-EDITING VECTOR PATENTS* 
JACOB S. SHERKOW** & CHRISTOPHER THOMAS SCOTT*** 
Concerns over patent protection covering new forms of gene 
editing have largely focused on the intellectual property covering 
the editing mechanism itself, most notably CRISPR (clustered 
regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats), but also ZFNs 
(zinc finger nucleases) and TALENs (transcription activator-like 
effector nucleases). Some of the most important technical 
advances in these areas, however, relate not to these technologies 
themselves but to vectors—the means for introducing the gene-
editing machinery into human cells. In this Article, we discuss the 
implications of one intellectual property strategy used by some 
commercial developers of gene-editing vectors: a divided strategy 
of keeping some of the most significant information about vectors 
secret while patenting, cryptically, other aspects. We liken this to 
the business strategy of a “pick-and-shovel play”: using secrecy as 
informational arbitrage to sell gene editing’s necessary equipment. 
Such a strategy raises specific ethical and safety issues pertaining 
to many gene therapy interventions—namely, the uncertainty of 
risk, a reliance on insufficient preclinical evidence, the detriment 
of patient-physician decisionmaking, and increases in monetary 
costs. At the same time, these bioethical issues seem to illuminate 
the importance of patents’ disclosure function to, perhaps 
surprisingly, consumers, users, and standards developers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Huck Finn, did you ever hear of a prisoner having picks and 
shovels, and all the modern conveniences in his wardrobe to dig 
himself out with? Now I want to ask you—if you got any 
reasonableness in you at all—what kind of a show would that give 
him to be a hero? Why, they might as well lend him the key, and 
done with it. Picks and shovels—why, they wouldn’t furnish ‘em 
to a king. 
—Mark Twain, Adventures of Huckleberry Finn1 
Much has been made about recent developments in genome-
editing technologies such as CRISPR that, depending upon one’s 
 
 1. MARK TWAIN, ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (TOM SAWYER’S 
COMRADE) 306 (Collectors Reprints Inc. 1991) (1885). 
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perspective, promise both the salvation and destruction of humankind.2 
But perhaps an equal amount of commentary on the technologies has 
been reserved for the patent estates covering them. Bioethicists, legal 
scholars, and the popular press have dissected, analyzed, and critiqued 
the genome-editing patent landscape in minute detail across a wide 
variety of publications that rival the number of papers describing uses 
of the technologies themselves.3 A substantial reason for this interest 
lies in the amount of money involved in patent licensing and litigation 
in this area: patent licenses for gene-editing technologies routinely 
command tens of millions of dollars that, in total, are likely worth many 
billions.4 The four principal companies, all publicly traded, that are 
today closest to delivering a genome-editing product are collectively 
 
 2. Compare, e.g., Giedrius Gasiunas & Virginijus Siksnys, RNA-Dependent DNA 
Endonuclease Cas9 of the CRISPR System: Holy Grail of Genome Editing?, 21 TRENDS 
MICROBIOLOGY 562, 562 (2013) (“Targeted genome editing technology that enables the 
generation of site-specific changes in the genomic DNA of cellular organisms is a Holy Grail 
for genome engineers.”), with Sheila Jasanoff, J. Benjamin Hurlbut & Krishanu Saha, 
CRISPR Democracy: Gene Editing and the Need for Inclusive Deliberation, 32 ISSUES SCI. 
& TECH., Fall 2015, http://issues.org/32-1/crispr-democracy-gene-editing-and-the-need-for-
inclusive-deliberation/ [https://perma.cc/WKN4-KRWM] (“CRISPR raises basic questions 
about the rightful place of science in governing the future in democratic societies.”). 
CRISPR is an acronym for “clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats.” 
Francisco J.M. Mojica et al., Intervening Sequences of Regularly Spaced Prokaryotic Repeats 
Derive from Foreign Genetic Elements, 60 J. MOLECULAR EVOLUTION 174, 174 (2005). 
 3. See, e.g., Knut J. Egelie et al., The Emerging Patent Landscape of CRISPR–Cas 
Gene Editing Technology, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1025, 1025 (2016) (discussing 
some ethical issues with the CRISPR patent landscape); Jacob S. Sherkow, The CRISPR 
Patent Landscape: Past, Present, and Future, 1 CRISPR J. 1, 3–4 (2018) [hereinafter 
Sherkow, CRISPR Patent Landscape] (opining on the future of the CRISPR patent 
landscape); see also Sharon Begley, As CRISPR Patent Fight Nears the Endgame, Where Are 
Settlement Talks?, STAT (May 2, 2018), https://www.statnews.com/2018/05/02/crispr-patent-
fight-settlement-talks/ [https://perma.cc/3VB3-HDQK (dark archive)] (reporting on the 
global CRISPR patent landscape). 
 4. See Caroline Chen & Doni Bloomfield, Gene-Editing Tool on Every Drugmaker’s 
2016 Wish List, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 24, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-12-24/the-gene-editing-tool-on-every-drugmaker-s-wish-list-this-year [https://perma.cc/
U8EP-5CDS (dark archive)] (reporting on value of license payments); Jacob S. Sherkow, 
How Much Is a CRISPR Patent License Worth?, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2017, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsherkow/2017/02/21/how-much-is-a-crispr-patent-license-
worth/#786147e6b777 [https://perma.cc/38QL-EWY4] (estimating the value of a CRISPR 
patent license). 
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worth roughly $5.5 billion.5 With no sense of understatement, genome-
editing intellectual property has been described as a new “gold rush.”6 
But as the adage goes, the best business to be in during a gold rush 
isn’t mining but selling picks and shovels.7 The same may ultimately be 
true for gene-editing intellectual property: the best bet may be 
licensing patents that make gene editing possible.8 In particular, gene-
editing technologies rely on critically important pieces of necessary 
equipment—vectors—that catalyze the introduction of the editing 
 
 5. As of the end of trading on May 8, 2019, Sangamo Therapeutics, Inc. had a market 
cap of $1.31 billion, Stock Quote: Sangamo Therapeutics, Inc., BLOOMBERG, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/SGMO:US [https://perma.cc/L9CF-M9CN (dark archive)] 
(last updated May 8, 2019), Editas Medicine, Inc., $1.24 billion, Stock Quote: Editas 
Medicine, Inc., BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/EDIT:US [https://perma.cc/
3YBY-3GPH (dark archive)] (last updated May 8, 2019), CRISPR Therapeutics AG, $2.11 
billion, Stock Quote: CRISPR Therapeutics AG, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/
quote/CRSP:US [https://perma.cc/WC46-Y92A (dark archive)] (last updated May 8, 2019), 
and Intellia Therapeutics Inc., $751 million, Stock Quote: Intellia Therapeutics, Inc., 
BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/NTLA:US [https://perma.cc/UR7E-M2XN 
(dark archive)] (last updated May 8, 2019). 
 6. Deborah Netburn, UC Berkeley Suffers Big Loss in CRISPR Patent Fight: What’s 
Next for the Powerful Gene-Editing Technology?, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017, 8:00 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-crispr-patent-decision-20170215-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/3TNH-4SGY (staff-uploaded archive)] (“CRISPR is a gold mine, and 
that’s why you are seeing a gold rush.”). 
 7. G. Thomas Goodnight & Sandy Green, Rhetoric, Risk, and Markets: The Dot-Com 
Bubble, 96 Q.J. SPEECH 115, 125 (2010) (“The [new] gold rush is following the classic 
pattern. It is not the diggers themselves who make the first money, but the manufacturers 
of picks and shovels.’’); Elicia Maine, Sarah Lubik & Elizabeth Garnsey, Process-Based vs. 
Product-Based Innovation: Value Creation by Nanotech Ventures, 32 TECHNOVATION 179, 
184 (2012) (describing fuel cell test equipment as a “‘pick and shovel’ niche strategy”); 
Christine Williamson, Cryptocurrency Concerns Keeping Investors at Bay, 45 PENSIONS & 
INV. 4, 6 (2017) (“As the old adage goes: In a gold rush, money is made by selling picks and 
shovels.”); Julia Fortier, There’s More than One Way to Make It in Biotech, BOS. GLOBE, 
Sept. 3, 1985, at B39 (“But hitting the pay dirt is still years in the future for most biotech 
companies. In the meantime, just as in the 1849 California Gold Rush, it’s the ‘picks and 
shovels’ people who are quietly raking in sales.”). 
 8. See Claudia Carbone et al., Lipid-Based Nanocarriers for Drug Delivery and 
Targeting: A Patent Survey of Methods of Production and Characterization, 2 
PHARMACEUTICAL PAT. ANALYST 665, 667–75 (2013) (analyzing patents covering lipid-
based nanocarriers); Virgínia Picanço-Castro, Elisa Maria de Sousa Russo-Carbolante & 
Dimas Tadeu Covas, Advances in Lentiviral Vectors: A Patent Review, 6 RECENT PATENTS 
ON DNA & GENE SEQUENCES 82, 82–90 (2012) (surveying the patent landscape of lentiviral 
vectors); Christopher Thomas Scott, The Zinc Finger Nuclease Monopoly, 23 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 915, 917 (2005) [hereinafter Scott, ZFN Monopoly] (“How did Sangamo 
reach its catbird’s seat? Credit CEO Edward Lanphier. In 1995, Lanphier was head of 
business development and chief financial officer of Alameda, California’s Somatix Therapy, 
a vector-based gene therapy company. .	 .	 . Somatix’s proprietary core was a gene vector 
delivery system.”). 
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equipment into cells that do not normally have them.9 And like most 
pick-and-shovel businesses, the companies responsible for gene-
editing vectors operate by strategically using secrecy to their 
advantage10—if everyone knew how to procure a gold rush’s necessary 
equipment, they would do it themselves. This Article explores a few of 
the ethical problems with this approach and what it says more generally 
about patent policy. 
While the phrase “pick-and-shovel play” sounds suggestive of 
unethical profiteering, the term is used today in a much more anodyne 
fashion simply to describe businesses that sell necessary equipment or 
services to other, often flashier, businesses.11 Internet network 
 
 9. James E. DiCarlo, Anurag Deeconda & Stephen H. Tsang, Viral Vectors, 
Engineered Cells and the CRISPR Revolution, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE 
AND BIOLOGY 3 (Stephen H. Tsang ed., 2017); Christopher E. Nelson & Charles A. 
Gersbach, Engineering Delivery Vehicles for Genome Editing, 7 ANN. REV. CHEMICAL & 
BIOMOLECULAR ENGINEERING 637, 640–49 (2016); Christopher Thomas Scott & Laura 
DeFrancesco, Gene Therapy’s Out-of-Body Experience, 34 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
600, 601–04 (2016); Gayong Shim et al., Therapeutic Gene Editing: Delivery and Regulatory 
Perspectives, 38 ACTA PHARMACOLOGICA SINICA 738, 739–40 (2017); Hao Yin, Kevin J. 
Kauffman & Daniel G. Anderson, Delivery Technologies for Genome Editing, 16 NATURE 
REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 387, 388–90 (2017). 
 10. See, e.g., Sergey Anokhin & Joakim Wincent, Technological Arbitrage 
Opportunities and Interindustry Differences in Entry Rates, 29 J. BUS. VENTURING 437, 440 
n.6 (2014) (“[E]ffective information exchange may even be purposefully sabotaged by 
innovator firms.”); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 
35, 40 (1997) (“[A]rbitrageurs do not share all their knowledge with investors, and cultivate 
secrecy to protect their knowledge from imitation.”); Wesley Gray, Information Exchange 
and the Limits of Arbitrage 4 (Munich Pers. RePEc Archive, Paper No. 11918, 2008), 
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11918/1/MPRA_paper_11918.pdf [https://perma.cc/M9UT-
UFKE] (“Why are arbitragers telling other arbitragers about their investment 
opportunities? According to efficient market logic, the rational arbitrager should act alone, 
drive the price to the fundamental level, and reap all the rewards of the arbitrage he has 
found.” (citation omitted)). See generally Matteo Acquilina et al., Asymmetries in Dark Pool 
Reference Prices 10 (Fin. Conduct Auth., Occasional Paper No. 21, Sept. 2016), 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/op16-21.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LMX-RM7N] (concluding 
that “dark pools” of traded equities take advantage of price information “[l]atency [to] give 
rise to arbitrage opportunities”); Huy N. Chau, Andrea Cosso & Claudio Fontana, The 
Value of Informational Arbitrage (arXiv, Paper No. 1804.00442v1), https://arxiv.org/
pdf/1804.00442v1 [https://perma.cc/4MKX-G737] (modeling the value of information 
asymmetries in arbitrage opportunities). 
 11. Jason Stutman, Who’s Making the Picks and Shovels of Tech?, WEALTH DAILY 
(Jan. 20, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://www.wealthdaily.com/articles/whos-making-the-picks-and-
shovels-of-tech/8495 [https://perma.cc/95SR-WY93] (“A pick-and-shovel play is, at its core, 
a company that sells products needed for a larger, overarching industry to operate.”); Pick-
And-Shovel Play, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pick-and-shovel-
play.asp [https://perma.cc/Q37F-WUWH] (“A pick-and-shovel play is an investment 
strategy that invests in the underlying technology needed to produce a good or service 
instead of in the final output. It is a way to invest in an industry without having to endure 
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equipment, product testing services, oil and gas storage, railcar 
equipment, and chemical manufacturers are all modern examples of 
pick-and-shovel plays.12 The origins of the phrase, however, are 
perhaps more instructive as to both why and how pick-and-shovel plays 
are often profitable ventures. In 1848, Samuel Brannan, a store owner 
at Sutter’s Fort, California, bought tin pans for 20¢ and sold them to 
prospectors for $15 each, all while publicizing the discovery of gold on 
the American River outside Sacramento.13 He quickly became a 
millionaire.14 But the core of his success was not so much his skills as a 
salesman but his knowledge—hidden from his customers—about 
where to obtain the equipment they otherwise needed.15 If everyone 
knew where to buy tin pans for 20¢, no one would have bought them 
from Sam Brannan for $15. The lesson of Brannan’s sale of tin pans is 
this: at the core of most good pick-and-shovel plays lies a devil’s 
bargain of secrecy and publicity.16 
If gene-editing technologies are gold, then the vectors used to 
implement the technologies are picks and shovels. Most gene-editing 
technologies rely on enzymes—typically DNA-cutting enzymes called 
nucleases—that are not naturally expressed in human cells.17 Physically 
getting those enzymes into human cells is a recurrent challenge in 
genetic engineering, and the vehicles used to do so are the enzymes’ 
vectors.18 Recent advances in vector technology have eased this process 
and appear to be especially promising in the implementation of gene-
 
the risks of the market for the final product. It is named after the tools needed to take part 
in the California Gold Rush.”). 
 12. E.g., Goodnight & Green, supra note 7, at 125; Maine et al., supra note 7, at 184; 
AnnaLisa Kraft, A Golden Portfolio with 5 Pick-and-Shovel Stocks, MOTLEY FOOL (Oct. 
18, 2013, 6:00 PM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2013/10/18/five-picks-and-
shovel-stocks-that-get-er-done.aspx [https://perma.cc/KU2F-RQQH]. 
 13. FRANK K. MARTIN, A DECADE OF DELUSIONS: FROM SPECULATIVE 
CONTAGION TO THE GREAT RECESSION 21 n.9 (2011) (“A metal pan that sold for 20 cents 
a few days earlier was now available from Brannan for 15 dollars.”); Douglas S. Watson, 
Herald of the Gold Rush: Sam Brannan, 10 CAL. HIST. SOC’Y Q. 298, 301 (1931) (“Rushing 
into San Francisco’s Plaza, he doffed his broad-brimmed black hat, and holding aloft a bottle 
of glittering particles in his left hand, he bellowed in his great bull voice: ‘GOLD! GOLD! 
GOLD! From the American River!’ The Gold Rush was born that instant.”). 
 14. Newell G. Bringhurst, Samuel Brannan and His Forgotten Final Years, 79 S. CAL. 
Q. 139, 139 (1997). 
 15. See id. at 145 (“Before Brannan allowed word of the discovery to leak out, the 
enterprising businessman scoured northern California purchasing and stocking his store 
with any and all merchandise of any conceivable use to the gold seekers.”). 
 16. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 17. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
 18. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
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editing technologies like CRISPR.19 Given the interest—and likely 
profitability—of gene-editing therapies, underlying vector 
technologies are especially valuable.20 As such, vector technology 
companies have deployed a strategy reminiscent of Brannan: they have 
publicized and patented the basic contours of some aspects of their 
technology while keeping others entirely secret. For example, uniQure 
touts a “Best-in-Class” vector delivery system,21 protected by a host of 
patents that cover its technology.22 But—by uniQure’s own 
admission—“significant aspects of the process by which we 
manufacture our gene therapies are based on unpatented trade secrets 
and know-how.”23 MaxCyte, another vector company, similarly 
provides a “patented, high-performance cell-engineering platform.”24 
But its patent applications do not disclose critical aspects of the 
platform, such as important manufacturing details.25 And Spark 
Therapeutics—a gene-therapy company proud of its “cutting-edge 
vector design,” with several pending patent applications to boot—
quietly makes use of an important safety-enhancing trade-secret 
technology owned by another company, Selecta Biosciences.26 
 
 19. See supra text accompanying note 9; see also infra Section I.A. 
 20. See Scott, ZFN Monopoly, supra note 8, at 917 (discussing the profitability of 
Somatix); Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 603 (noting bluebird bio’s then market cap 
of $1.35 billion). In addition, Spark Therapeutics, a viral vector platform company, has a 
market cap of almost $4.16 billion. Stock Quote: Spark Therapeutics, Inc., BLOOMBERG, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/ONCE:US [https://perma.cc/7BYY-2S3S (dark archive)] 
(last updated May 8, 2019). 
 21. uniQure’s Technology: Excellence in Gene Therapy Through Innovative Modular 
Technology, Proprietary Manufacturing and the Experience to Achieve Success, UNIQURE, 
http://www.uniqure.com/gene-therapy/uniqure-technology.php [https://perma.cc/6F8N-9B6E] 
[hereinafter uniQure’s Technology]. 
 22. Gene Therapy: Intellectual Property, UNIQURE, http://www.uniqure.com/gene-
therapy/gene-therapy-intellectual-property.php [https://perma.cc/69UM-4GJ6]. 
 23. UNIQURE N.V., ANNUAL REPORT 2017, at 16 (2018), http://www.uniqure.com/
uniQure%20Annual%20Accounts%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJD3-5TZK]. 
 24. About Us: Driving a New Generation of Cell-based Medicines, MAXCYTE, 
https://www.maxcyte.com/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/7SQF-9WE3] [hereinafter About Us]. 
 25. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,132,153 (filed May 24, 2013) (claiming methods of 
modifying certain cells with mRNA, without disclosing specific mRNA sequences); U.S. 
Patent No. 8,450,112 (filed Apr. 9, 2009) (same). 
 26. Selecta Biosciences, Inc., Annual Report 4 (Form 10-K) (Mar. 27, 2017), 
http://ir.selectabio.com/static-files/35d1c085-9947-4d8d-aa61-dd3c05d0b280 [https://perma.cc/
3C4F-P7N5]; Spark Therapeutics, Inc., Annual Report 19 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2018), 
http://ir.sparktx.com/static-files/28cb5c84-8bf4-4aea-b028-60a3d5278b8b [https://perma.cc/
5DFR-HTT3]. 
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This divided strategy of patenting, commercialization, and secrecy 
is not atypical in the biotechnology space.27 But it poses some specific 
ethical problems for gene editing as a therapeutic. First, it makes the 
risk of gene-editing therapies wholly uncertain and difficult to assess.28 
Given gene editing’s recent successes, and the horrifying nature of 
many genetic diseases, patients and subjects may be pressured into 
experimental therapies with imperfect information about a vector’s 
overall safety profile.29 Historically, it is difficulties with gene therapies’ 
vectors—not the therapies’ genetic modifications themselves—that 
have resulted in trial subjects’ deaths and adverse events.30 Second, 
where patent information does exist, it may not be trustworthy—for a 
number of reasons, the information disclosed in patents tends to be 
unreliable and based on entirely insufficient preclinical evidence.31 
Third, the lack of sufficient information about the mechanisms and 
 
 27. Karl F. Jorda, Patent and Trade Secret Complementariness: An Unsuspected 
Synergy, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 29 (2008) (describing the case of Premarin (conjugated 
estrogens)); W. Nicholson Price II, Expired Patents, Trade Secrets, and Stymied Competition, 
92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1611, 1624–26 (2017) (describing this dynamic for biologics); 
Brenda M. Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 377, 406 
(2017) (discussing the “use of patents and trade secrets as complements .	.	. in fields in which 
some disclosure of post-patenting data is required for regulatory purposes, such as medical 
devices or pharmaceuticals”). 
 28. See Clare E. Thomas, Anja Ehrhardt & Mark A. Kay, Progress and Problems with 
the Use of Viral Vectors for Gene Therapy, 4 NATURE REV. GENETICS 346, 346 (2003) 
(reviewing “the advances in the development of viral vectors, as well as discussing the 
substantial challenges that remain before gene therapy can truly fulfil all of its promises”); 
Aaron D. Levine, Revolutionary New Cancer Therapies Come with Big Risks. Drug Makers 
Must Be Prepared, STAT (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/11/08/car-t-cancer-
death-pharma-companies/ [https://perma.cc/G3QM-ZWDE] (discussing some of the risks 
of immunotherapy vectors). 
 29. See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, & MED., HUMAN GENOME EDITING: 
SCIENCE, ETHICS, AND GOVERNANCE 7 (2017) [hereinafter NASEM, HUMAN GENOME 
EDITING] (noting gene editing’s potential to create “social pressure[s] for people to use 
technologies they would not otherwise choose”); id. at 49–51 (listing some of the 
uncertainties surrounding new viral vectors); Levine, supra note 28 (noting “the clamor of 
individual patients and patient organizations to rapidly expand the use of CAR-T therapy 
.	.	. and accompanying pressures” despite clinical trial subjects’ deaths). 
 30. See NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 88–89 (describing 
safety issues with gene-editing vectors); Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 347 (discussing 
adverse events of gene-editing vectors); Levine, supra note 28 (discussing the potential for 
CAR-T clinical trial deaths). 
 31. See Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 DUKE L.J. 845, 
883–85 (2017) [hereinafter Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox] (“[D]rug 
developers often rely on early preclinical studies to bolster their patents. By design, these 
studies often have small sample sizes; employ little statistical power; and, of course, suffer 
from conflicts of interest between industrial researchers and their employers—all hallmarks 
of irreproducibility.”). 
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reliability of gene-editing vectors—through published research that 
would fully test them—hampers physicians’ ability to properly inform 
their patients of the benefits and burdens of a given course of 
treatment.32 And fourth, having an additional layer of patent 
protection for gene-editing technologies is likely to contribute to 
relatively higher monetary costs of treatment where such therapies are 
available.33 This is especially problematic where new DNA- and RNA-
based therapies already routinely command close to a half-million 
dollars for a course of treatment, prices that threaten to break health-
care payer systems.34 
At the same time, these problems with patents’ role in the pick-
and-shovel play shine some light on patent law’s disclosure function.35 
 
 32. See NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 26 (“[O]utside of a 
study, ‘off-label’ use in clinical care is entirely legal, and has become a common practice 
among physicians with respect to drugs, and might be available for a gene transfer product 
using genome editing once it is approved. Physicians use their own expertise and sources of 
information, as well as the advice of professional societies.”); George A. Beller, President’s 
Page: Convocation Address, 35 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1694, 1695 (2000) (“A second 
ethical challenge arises with the need to disclose to patients all the risks from potentially 
dangerous new treatments such as gene therapy using viral vectors. We must let patients 
know all the risks, and we must explain those risks in language that is easily understood.”); 
Edmund D. Pellegrino, Patient and Physician Autonomy: Conflicting Rights and Obligations 
in the Physician-Patient Relationship, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 47, 52 (1994) 
(arguing that “physician’s autonomy as a physician is also grounded in the possession of 
expert knowledge needed by sick people and society”); Scott, ZFN Monopoly, supra note 
8, at 918 (reporting that some “physician-scientists” support an “open resource” of gene-
editing information); see also Dianne Nicol et al., Key Challenges in Bringing CRISPR-
Mediated Somatic Cell Therapy into the Clinic, 9 GENOME MED. 85, 87 (2017) (“Issues 
surrounding patent ownership and validity feed into clinical delivery.”). 
 33. See Lori Knowles, Westerly Luth & Tania Bubela, Paving the Road to Personalized 
Medicine: Recommendations on Regulatory, Intellectual Property and Reimbursement 
Challenges, 4 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 453, 492–94 (2017) (describing the literature on the 
connection between personalized medicine and patents); Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, 
Patents, and the Public Health, 90 YALE J. BIOLOGY & MED. 667, 667–68 (2017) [hereinafter 
Sherkow, Public Health] (discussing patents’ contribution to gene-therapy drug pricing). 
 34. Robert Cook-Deegan, Gene Patents, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND BENCH TO 
CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR JOURNALISTS, 
POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 69 (Mary Crowley ed., 2008) (“One concern is that 
patents might make the cost of genetic tests and genetic therapies unacceptably high.”); 
Sherkow, Public Health, supra note 33, at 668–69 (discussing genetic therapies in the context 
of insurance reimbursement); Meghana Keshavan, We May Soon Have Our First $1 Million 
Drug. Who Will Pay for It? And How?, STAT (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.statnews.com/
2017/10/13/gene-therapy-pricing/ [https://perma.cc/SAB8-5CCT] (reporting that a gene 
vector company’s patented treatment “could cost $1 million per patient” and asking 
whether private insurers or “taxpayers, via Medicaid and Medicare,” would be willing to 
pay). 
 35. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1022 (1989) (“This enabling disclosure becomes 
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Ideally, patents’ disclosure function goes beyond merely a tit-for-tat 
trade of technical information—it allows markets and physicians to 
critically assess whether, how, and to what extent to adopt a new 
technology, and how much to pay for it.36 Contrary to pick-and-shovel 
strategies, generally, robust disclosure in patents also allows users to 
assess the costs of inventing around a particular technology rather than 
licensing from the patent owner—that is, to decide whether to find tin 
pans on one’s own or buy them from Sam Brannan.37 And lastly, it 
 
freely available to the public as soon as the patent issues; the patent holder may not 
thereafter monitor or control access to it.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA 
L. REV. 539, 548 (2009) (“[Patent disclosure] permits society at large to apply the 
information by freely making or using the patented invention after the expiration of the 
patent.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 131 (2006) 
(“[T]he public benefits from the disclosure of the invention because the public storehouse 
of knowledge is thus enhanced, allowing others to rely upon the teachings of the patent to 
generate even further, follow-on innovation.”); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of 
Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 624 (2010) (“[T]he technical information disclosed 
in the patent document has potential immediate value to the public, which can use the 
information for any purpose that does not infringe upon the claims.”). 
 36. See J. Jonas Anderson, Nontechnical Disclosure, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1575 
(2016) (“[A] patent can inform innovators, investors, and consumers about the value of an 
inventive idea.”); Alan Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 401, 425 (2010) (“Disclosure may provide a better justification [of the 
patent system]. .	.	. [T]hese inventions are presumably of some worth to third parties as well, 
be they competitors, scientists, or consumers.”); Fromer, supra note 35, at 548–49 
(“[D]isclosure can stimulate others to design around the invention or conceive of new 
inventions—either by improving upon the invention or by being inspired by it—even during 
the patent term.”); Shubha Ghosh, Decentering the Consuming Self: Personalized Medicine, 
Science, and the Market for Lemons, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 299, 337–38 (2015) (“As 
information flourishes in personalized medicine, disclosures for consumers can become 
more meaningful and provide guidance in how to respond to identified disease proclivities 
and risk. This more liberal patent regime, combined with disclosure solutions, may provide 
the best set of regulations to allow the market for personalized medicine to mature and the 
field to progress for the benefits of patients.”). 
 37. See Kevin Emerson Collins, The Structural Implications of Inventors’ Disclosure 
Obligations, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1785, 1786 (2016) (“From the moment patent disclosures are 
published, the public has a privilege to freely engage in activities such as disseminating the 
disclosed knowledge and employing the disclosed knowledge as an input into the creative 
cognition that conceives yet further innovation, including both improvements and design-
arounds.”); Fromer, supra note 35, at 541 (“[P]atent disclosure indirectly stimulates future 
innovation by revealing the invention’s design so that others can use it fruitfully when the 
patent term expires and design around, improve upon, or be inspired by the invention, even 
during the patent term.”); Jorda, supra note 27, at 26 (“Patent applications and patents, after 
they are published and the invention is disclosed, often spur competitors to invent around 
and develop improved products. These products may be separately patented, may not be 
dominated, and may become commercially more important than the earlier, more basic 
invention.”); Dmitry Karshtedt, The Completeness Requirement in Patent Law, 56 B.C. L. 
REV. 949, 996 (2015) (noting that a “completeness” requirement in patent disclosures 
“would encourage productive design-arounds”); Sean B. Seymore, Uninformative Patents, 
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shows that poor disclosure may lead to suboptimal and early platform 
standardization—users being locked into a particular iteration of a 
required technology because it is one of few widely available.38 With 
respect to gene-editing vectors, this means letting information about 
vectors, rather than knowledge of diseases and the biology of vector-
payload systems, control which therapies are ultimately developed.39 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I gives a brief overview of 
gene editing, vectors, and intellectual property, including a discussion 
of the importance of vectors for gene-editing technologies and 
historical concerns about their safety. Part II then describes the gene-
editing vector pick-and-shovel play at the core of this Article. On this 
foundation, Part III explores several ethical issues arising from this 
pick-and-shovel play—namely its unwarranted risk to patients and 
clinical subjects, its reliance on unreliable preclinical evidence, its 
effects on physician-patient decisionmaking, and its increased cost of 
 
55 HOUS. L. REV. 377, 395–96 (2017) (“Theory posits that disclosure inspires others to learn 
about the invention, design around it, improve upon it, or conceive of entirely new 
inventions—all during the patent term.”); Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting 
by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 135 
(2010) (discussing the connection between patents’ disclosure and entrepreneur’s decisions 
to avoid licensing); Gerald Sobel, Patent Scope and Competition: Is the Federal Circuit’s 
Approach Correct?, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3, 59 n.181 (2002) (“Disclosure may permit 
competitors to ‘invent around’ or invent improvements of the patented invention.”). 
 38. Cf. Jonathan M. Barnett, The Host’s Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in Platform 
Markets for Informational Goods, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1865 (2011) (identifying the 
“host’s dilemma” as attempts to “platform” the host’s technology without expropriating 
user investment); Jorge L. Contreras, Much Ado About Hold-Up, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Contreras, Much Ado] (manuscript at 7–8), 
https://dc.law.utah.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1106&context=scholarship [https://perma.cc/
C522-HM3D] (“[T]he manufacturer’s cost of switching from the standardized technology to 
an alternative may be prohibitive (a situation often referred to as ‘lock-in’).”); Mark A. 
Lemley, Patenting Nanotechnology, 58 STAN. L. REV. 601, 606–13 (2005) (recounting the 
history of early patents on “building blocks” of nascent technologies); Joseph Scott Miller, 
Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 
40 IND. L. REV. 351, 386 (2007) (“[A] central licensing entity [is] an example of the 
corporate form as an access lock-in governance mechanism.”); Jesse L. Reynolds, Jorge L. 
Contreras & Joshua D. Sarnoff, Solar Climate Engineering and Intellectual Property: 
Toward a Research Commons, 18 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 58–59 (2017) (describing how 
patent platforming risks “technological lock-in” for solar climate engineering). 
 39. See, e.g., Luigi Naldini, Gene Therapy Returns to Centre Stage, 526 NATURE 351, 
351 (2015) (noting the importance of vector biology in making gene therapy successful); 
Michael F. Naso et al., Adeno-Associated Virus (AAV) as a Vector for Gene Therapy, 31 
BIODRUGS 317, 317 (2017) (“There has been a resurgence in gene therapy efforts that is 
partly fueled by the identification and understanding of new gene delivery vectors.”); 
Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 346 (“The message we have extracted from a history of 
anticipation and disappointment is that the future success of gene therapy will be founded 
on a thorough understanding of vector biology and pharmacology.”). 
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treatment. Finally, Part IV uses this analysis to illuminate several 
aspects of patents’ disclosure function including consumer assessment, 
the costs of inventing around, and early platform standardization. 
I.  GENE EDITING, VECTORS, AND IP 
A. Gene-Editing Technologies 
Genome editing is “a powerful new tool for making precise 
additions, deletions, and alterations to the genome—an organism’s 
complete set of genetic material.”40 Since 1997, a suite of new gene-
editing approaches has emerged, with the CRISPR/Cas9 system 
perhaps the most promising.41 This system—guided by flexible and 
“programmable” strands of RNA, DNA’s molecular cousin—has 
made editing of the genome more precise, efficient, feasible, and less 
costly relative to previous protein-based technologies such as zinc 
finger nucleases (“ZFNs”) or transcription activator-like effector 
nucleases (“TALENs”).42 
With these advances has come an explosion of interest in the 
possible applications of genome editing, both in conducting basic 
research and the potential to prevent, treat, and cure disease and 
disability. Genome editing could provide insights into reproductive 
failures and improve contraception and fertility treatments.43 In 
embryos, CRISPR has been used to study the genetics of early human 
 
 40. NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 1; see also NUFFIELD 
COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, GENOME EDITING: AN ETHICAL REVIEW 4 (2016), 
http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/Genome-editing-an-ethical-review.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H6QF-7N9U] (“What we will refer to as ‘genome editing’ is the practice 
of making targeted interventions at the molecular level of DNA or RNA function, 
deliberately to alter the structural or functional characteristics of biological entities.”); Jin-
Soo Kim, Genome Editing Comes of Age, 11 NATURE PROTOCOLS 1573, 1573 (2016). 
 41. See Le Cong et al., Multiplex Genome Engineering Using CRISPR/Cas Systems, 339 
SCIENCE 819, 819–22 (2013); Jennifer A. Doudna & Emmanuelle Charpentier, The New 
Frontier of Genome Engineering with CRISPR-Cas9, 346 SCIENCE 1077, 1077 (2014); 
Patrick D. Hsu, Eric S. Lander & Feng Zhang, Development and Applications of CRISPR-
Cas9 for Genome Engineering, 157 CELL 1262, 1263–64 (2014).  
 42. Rajat M. Gupta & Kiran Musunuru, Expanding the Genetic Editing Tool Kit: ZFNs, 
TALENs, and CRISPR-Cas9, 124 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 4154, 4156–57 (2014); see 
also Jeffrey C. Miller et al., A TALE Nuclease Architecture for Efficient Genome Editing, 
29 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 143, 143 (2011); Fyodor D. Urnov et al., Genome Editing 
with Engineered Zinc Finger Nucleases, 11 NATURE REVIEWS GENETICS 636, 636 (2010). 
 43. Meizhu Bai et al., Spermatogenic Cell-Specific Gene Mutation in Mice via 
CRISPR/Cas9, 43 J. GENETICS & GENOMICS 289, 290–92 (2016). 
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development.44 In ex vivo approaches—that is, in cells physically 
outside of an organism—editing platforms have been used to deliver 
“gene-free” gene therapy for animals,45 revert genetic defects such as 
hemophilia A in stem cells,46 and functionally correct genetic mutations 
of human Duchenne muscular dystrophy.47 
This interest extends beyond correcting currently existing 
defects—it also includes curiosity into fixing such errors before they 
take root: editing eggs, sperm, and embryos (i.e., the human 
“germline”) to prevent genetic disease in future children and their 
descendants.48 Recently, controversial experiments by researchers 
using nonviable and viable human embryos used germline editing in 
genetic disease, examining the safety and feasibility of CRISPR.49 In a 
review published in June, scientists connected the cellular repair 
process to “mosaicism”—a patchwork of edited and unedited cells.50 
Other researchers have found that similar techniques resulted in 
incomplete editing and “off-target effects,” edits to subjects’ DNA that 
were otherwise unintended.51 And even when gene editing does work 
as technically intended, it may result in unpredictable and harmful 
effects. In a recent study, U.K. researchers found significant numbers 
of on-target mutations, but with potentially pathogenic consequences.52 
In the United States, ex vivo clinical trials for cancer and sickle cell 
 
 44. Norah M.E. Fogarty et al., Genome Editing Reveals a Role for OCT4 in Human 
Embryogenesis, 550 NATURE 67, 67 (2017). 
 45. See Thomas Gaj et al., Targeted Gene Knockout by Direct Delivery of Zinc-Finger 
Nuclease Proteins, 9 NATURE METHODS 805, 805, 807 (2012). 
 46. Chul-Yong Park et al., Functional Correction of Large Factor VIII Gene 
Chromosomal Inversions in Hemophilia A Patient-Derived iPSCs Using CRISPR-Cas9, 17 
CELL STEM CELL 213, 213 (2015). 
 47. Courtney S. Young et al., A Single CRISPR-Cas9 Deletion Strategy that Targets the 
Majority of DMD Patients Restores Dystrophin Function in hiPSC-Derived Muscle Cells, 18 
CELL STEM CELL 533, 533 (2016). 
 48. NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 91–93. 
 49. See generally Xiangjin Kang et al., Introducing Precise Genetic Modifications into 
Human 3PN Embryos by CRISPR/Cas-mediated Genome Editing, 33 J. ASSISTED REPROD. 
& GENETICS 581 (2016) (discussing viable embryos); Puping Liang et al., CRISPR/Cas9-
mediated Gene Editing in Human Tripronuclear Zygotes, 6 PROTEIN & CELL 363 (2015) 
(discussing nonviable embryos); Hong Ma et al., Correction of a Pathogenic Gene Mutation 
in Human Embryos, 548 NATURE 413 (2017) (discussing nonviable embryos). 
 50. Stella Baliou et al., CRISPR Therapeutic Tools for Complex Genetic Disorders and 
Cancer, 53 INT’L J. ONCOLOGY 443, 450 (2018). 
 51. E.g., Shim et al., supra note 9, at 747 (noting the risk of unsafe off-target effects for 
some vectors). 
 52. Michael Kosicki, Kärt Tomberg & Allan Bradley, Repair of Double-Strand Breaks 
Induced by CRISPR-Cas9 Leads to Large Deletions and Complex Rearrangements, 36 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 765, 765 (2018). 
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anemia are set to commence, though the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) has placed a hold on the sickle cell trial 
sponsored by CRISPR Therapeutics.53 Despite substantial concerns 
over the safety of in vivo approaches, China has treated over eighty 
subjects with CRISPR interventions.54 This now includes news of 
Chinese researcher He Jiankui, who “engineered” the birth of two 
CRISPR-edited twins, with a third baby on the way. (In dramatic 
fashion, this was announced in December 2018 at an international 
human genome-editing summit in Hong Kong.) He’s procedure was 
deceptive, violated Chinese law, flaunted international ethical norms, 
and put the babies at physical risk. Dr. He has since been fired from his 
university, and Dr. He, his mentors, and his collaborators are now 
under investigation.55 Nonetheless, the outrage from the international 
scientific and bioethics communities was unanimous, and such 
limitations have the potential to stand as major hurdles facing eventual 
clinical applications. 
B. Invention, Disclosure, and the Gene-Editing Patent Estate 
Despite this potential for peril, the promise of CRISPR and other 
gene-editing technologies has yielded substantial patent estates. The 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) has issued over 450 
patents to core aspects of CRISPR as of the date of this writing.56 A 
more thorough landscaping analysis by researchers in Scandinavia and 
Colorado found hundreds more patent families on CRISPR 
components worldwide.57 Currently, fundamental aspects of one 
 
 53. Rich Haridy, FDA Hits Pause on One of the First US Human Clinical Trials to Use 
CRISPR, NEW ATLAS (May 31, 2018), https://newatlas.com/us-crispr-human-trial-hold-
fda/54862/ [https://perma.cc/9W4N-J78D]. 
 54. Preetika Rana, Amy Dockser Marcus & Wenxin Fan, China Races Ahead in Gene 
Editing, WALL ST. J., Jan. 22, 2018, at A1, A10. 
 55. Id.; Christopher Thomas Scott & Cynthia Selin, What to Expect When Expecting 
CRISPR Baby Number Four, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Mar. 2019, at 7, 7–9; Todd Ackerman, 
Lawyers Say Rice Professor Not Involved in Controversial Gene-Edited Babies Research, 
HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 13, 2018, 9:11 PM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-
texas/houston/article/Lawyers-say-Rice-professor-not-involved-in-13465277.php/ [https://perma.cc/
496Z-Z9VC]; Antonio Regalado, The Chinese Scientist Who Claims He Made CRISPR 
Babies Is Under Investigation, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 26, 2018), 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612466/the-chinese-scientist-who-claims-he-made-crispr-
babies-has-been-suspended-without-pay/ [https://perma.cc/PH8G-WG9E]; Christopher 
Thomas Scott, Opinion, Gene-Edited Babies Have Been Born. Now What?, HOUS. CHRON. 
(Dec. 4, 2018, 10:24 AM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/local/gray-matters/article/
gene-edited-babies-crispr-ethics-research-13439892.php [https://perma.cc/8ZG7-8PWN]. 
 56. Sherkow, CRISPR Patent Landscape, supra note 3, at 3. 
 57. Egelie et al., supra note 3, at 1027–28. 
97 N.C. L. REV. 1497 (2019) 
2019] PICKS AND SHOVELS OF VECTOR PATENTS 1511 
 
variant of CRISPR—applications using the Cas9 enzyme—are the 
subject of a particularly heated patent dispute between the University 
of California, Berkeley, and the Broad Institute of MIT and Harvard.58 
The dispute has raised a host of concerns about the future of CRISPR 
research and commercial development as well as the role of patenting 
in modern universities and research centers.59 Similar controversies are 
ongoing for ZFNs and TALENs, alike.60 
At the same time, these technologies are undergoing a literal 
renaissance—a “rebirthing”—despite, or perhaps because of, the 
patent estates covering their earlier versions. New enzymes have been 
found and in some cases engineered to use the technologies’ basic 
components without treading on the claims of ongoing patent 
disputes.61 Developing synthetic or recombinant enzymes is also used 
to further improve the technology—to make gene editing more or less 
error prone, available to more portions of the genome, or increasingly 
precise.62 In describing CRISPR, for example, the moniker “gene 
editing” has accordingly conjured up metaphors of word processing, 
with Cas9, the enzyme that kicked off the CRISPR craze in 2012, being 
likened to cut-and-paste.63 To further the analogy, new enzymes, to 
date, can find-and-replace, randomly delete, and highlight text.64 
 
 58. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Broad Inst., Inc., 903 F.3d 1286, 1289–90 (Fed. Cir. 
2018). 
 59. E.g., Jorge L. Contreras & Jacob S. Sherkow, CRISPR, Surrogate Licensing, and 
Scientific Discovery, 355 SCIENCE 698, 698 (2017); Sherkow, Public Health, supra note 33, 
at 668–69 (noting the potential effects of the dispute on insurance coverage); Jacob S. 
Sherkow, Pursuit of Profit Poisons Collaboration, 532 NATURE 172, 172 (2016). 
 60. E.g., Helga Schinkel & Stefan Schillberg, Genome Editing: Intellectual Property and 
Product Development in Plant Biotechnology, 35 PLANT CELL REP. 1487, 1488 (2016) 
(discussing TALEN patent controversies); Scott, ZFN Monopoly, supra note 8, at 915–16 
(discussing ZFN patent controversies). 
 61. Sherkow, CRISPR Patent Landscape, supra note 3, at 4 (“New applications for 
CRISPR .	.	. continue to arise at a rapid pace. .	.	. This includes the continual discovery of 
new nucleases, such as CasX, CasY, and Cas13a, that belong to new types and subtypes of 
CRISPR-Cas systems.”). 
 62. See generally Jason M. Gehrke et al., High-Precision CRISPR-Cas9 Base Editors 
with Minimized Bystander and Off-Target Mutations (bioRXiv, Working Paper No. 273938, 
2018), https://www.biorxiv.org/content/biorxiv/early/2018/03/01/273938.full.pdf [http://perma.cc/
D89Y-FTUH (staff-uploaded archive)] (using CRISPR/Cas9 technology to improve the 
precision of base editors). 
 63. See, e.g., Sharon Begley, Meet One of the World’s Most Groundbreaking Scientists. 
He’s 34., STAT (Nov. 6, 2015), https://www.statnews.com/2015/11/06/hollywood-inspired-
scientist-rewrite-code-life/ [https://perma.cc/EPL6-72RT] (containing a video analogizing 
CRISPR to a word processor). 
 64. See Jonathan S. Gootenberg et al., Multiplexed and Portable Nucleic Acid Detection 
Platform with Cas13, Cas12a, and Csm6, 360 SCIENCE 439, 439 (2018) (using the 
nonspecificity of some enzymes to randomly delete other nucleic acid segments); Charleston 
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In virtually all of these cases, these technologies—including the 
original CRISPR/Cas9 technology—have been widely disclosed. 
Researchers have published thousands of papers on CRISPR since its 
advent in 2012.65 As an example of how quickly the field is moving, 
genome-editing publications increased by 1453% from 2011–2016.66 
There is video, using high-speed atomic-force microscopy, of Cas9 
cleaving a piece of DNA.67 CRISPR has been so thoroughly adopted 
that it has become an internet meme—“CRISPR/Cas9: So Hot Right 
Now”68—and investors in companies working with CRISPR have 
complained of “CRISPR fatigue.”69 Researchers have largely made 
their materials freely available through a revolutionary nonprofit 
organization, AddGene, which supplies CRISPR materials—namely 
constructs of DNA that code for CRISPR components—and materials 
transfer agreements and documentation to use the technology for 
academic scientists.70 Patents in this area most thoroughly disclose the 
science undergirding their claims; whatever deficiencies exist are 
 
Noble et al., Evolutionary Dynamics of CRISPR Gene Drives, 3 SCI. ADVANCES, no. 
e1601964, Apr. 5, 2017, at 1, 1 (likening CRISPR gene drives to a search-and-replace 
function); Lei S. Qi et al., Repurposing CRISPR as an RNA-Guided Platform for Sequence-
Specific Control of Gene Expression, 152 CELL 1173, 1173 (2013) (showing that catalytically 
inactive CRISPR enzymes can regulate gene expression, akin to highlighting text to increase 
its visibility). 
 65. CRISPR, ELSEVIER, https://www.elsevier.com/research-intelligence/campaigns/
crispr [https://perma.cc/YU62-MYKP]. 
 66. STAT’s Stats of the Year: 2016 by the Numbers, STAT (Dec. 28, 2016), 
https://www.statnews.com/2016/12/28/stat-stats-year-in-numbers/ [https://perma.cc/6F62-
A866]. 
 67. Sarah Zhang, An Astonishing Video Shows CRISPR Editing DNA in Real Time, 
ATLANTIC (Nov. 13, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/11/crispr-
video-real-time/545603/ [https://perma.cc/6CMT-WVWE]. 
 68. Mugatu So Hot Right Now, IMGFLIP, https://imgflip.com/i/1fdwb4 
[http://perma.cc/U6R6-WBLF]; cf. ZOOLANDER (Paramount Pictures 2001) (movie from 
which the meme originated). And, in a remarkable, surreal example of life imitating art, 
scientists have put a “meme” in bacterial cells using CRISPR. Taylor Hatmaker, Scientists 
Have Inserted a GIF of a Horse into Living Bacteria — Did Your Brain Just Explode?, 
TECHCRUNCH (July 12, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/12/harvard-nature-crispr-
cas1-cas2-horse-gif/ [https://perma.cc/PP5H-Y4WM]. 
 69. Max Nisen, CRISPR Therapeutics IPO: Bad Timing is Costly, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 
20, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-10-20/crispr-therapeutics-ipo-
bad-timing-is-costly [https://perma.cc/C6W5-QUV4 (dark archive)]. 
 70. ADDGENE, https://www.addgene.org/ [http://perma.cc/9SXP-Y2PG]; see also Neil 
C. Thompson & Samantha Zyontz, Who Tries (and Who Succeeds) in Staying at the 
Forefront of Science: Evidence from the DNA-Editing Technology, CRISPR 9–10 (Nov. 
17, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3073227 [http://perma.cc/VUN3-9237]. 
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readily ascertainable from the scientific literature.71 Patent estates and 
patent disputes notwithstanding, basic information about CRISPR has 
been disclosed to all. 
C. The Importance of Vectors 
Whichever fundamental gene-editing technology is used, it needs 
a way to deliver its machinery into cells—“vectors.”72 The concept of 
gene editing as therapy for genetic disease is straightforward: a vector 
carrying a gene-editing enzyme, or DNA coding for a gene-editing 
enzyme, delivers its payload to a cell.73 This is frequently accompanied 
by DNA or RNA to replace the defective gene (a “knock-in” 
approach) or, more simply, introduce a mutation into a functioning 
gene (a “knock-out” strategy).74 Gene editing can be accomplished 
using vectors ex vivo: the transference of genetic material to cells that 
have been removed from a patient.75 After editing, the corrected cells 
are then subsequently reintroduced.76 Alternatively, a vector carrying 
the functional gene copy is directly injected into the body to achieve in 
vivo gene transfer.77 In either case, for gene-editing technology to 
actually work as therapy it must be accompanied by a safe, effective, 
and suitable vector.78 
To date, a handful of experiments have shown the safety and 
efficacy of several vectors that may ultimately prove useful for gene 
therapy.79 These can largely be grouped into two types: nonviral 
 
 71. See Egelie et al., supra note 3, at 1028–29 (assessing the technical disclosures of 
CRISPR patent families). 
 72. See DiCarlo et al., supra note 9, at 3; Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 640–49; 
Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 601–04; Yin et al., supra note 9, at 388–90. 
 73. See DiCarlo et al., supra note 9, at 3–4. 
 74. See id. at 5–6. 
 75. Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 647; Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 600; 
Shim et al., supra note 9, at 740; Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 348; Yin et al., supra note 
9, at 390. 
 76. See Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 647; Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 
600; Shim et al., supra note 9, at 740; Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 348; Yin et al., supra 
note 9, at 390. 
 77. Shim et al., supra note 9, at 740; Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 350; Yin et al., supra 
note 9, at 392–94. 
 78. Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 637; see also Roland W. Herzog, Ou Cao & 
Arun Srivastava, Two Decades of Clinical Gene Therapy—Success Is Finally Mounting, 9 
DISCOVERY MED. 105, 105–06 (2010). 
 79. See Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 351–52 (reviewing some of the most promising 
vectors). See generally Jacob S. Sherkow, Patricia J. Zettler & Henry T. Greely, Peer 
Commentary, Is It ‘Gene Therapy’?, J.L. & BIOSCIENCES, no. lsy020, Sept. 18, 2018, at 1 
(defining “gene therapy” and reviewing the safety of some vectors). 
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vectors, those that do not make use of viruses; and viral vectors, those 
that do.80 Each has demonstrated some successes in laboratory 
experiments. CRISPR systems, for example, have given promise that 
delivery of DNA, RNA, or an active enzyme to the target tissue or cells 
of interest can be achieved nonvirally.81 Ex vivo studies—those editing 
cells once removed from the body—currently lead the way for 
advances in nonviral vectors. The same applies to most preclinical 
experiments. Such studies use diverse mechanisms to achieve editing 
nonvirally through methods like direct injections of plasmid DNA or 
RNA.82 In one experiment using human-induced pluripotent stem cells 
carrying the Duchenne muscular dystrophy mutation, plasmid delivery 
of a CRISPR protein restored the cells’ dystrophin function.83 In 
another, a similar approach successfully corrected deficiencies in the 
human β-thalassemia gene in mice.84 Physically disrupting cells is yet 
another ex vivo delivery method through electroporation or cell-
penetrating peptides and could conceivably be used in localized in vivo 
cases.85 Liposomes, yet another nonviral method, have long been used 
to transfect DNA and RNA into cells and, after thirty years of 
development, have advanced into gene-therapy trials, most notably for 
cystic fibrosis and cancer.86 Chinese researchers have reportedly used 
liposomes to deliver CRISPR into mice with solid tumors, improving 
their survival.87 Finally, protein-based systems can deliver a functional 
CRISPR complex—the Cas9 enzyme along with guide RNA—directly 
inside target cells.88 
 
 80. Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 637, 640–42, 646–47. 
 81. Id. at 642. 
 82. See id. at 649. These pose technical hurdles, however: nonviral vectors must be 
engineered to protect their DNA and RNA from degradation by other enzymes during 
transport. Yin et al., supra note 9, at 391 (“[B]are nucleic acid is subject to degradation by 
endogenous nucleases in the blood.”). 
 83. Young et al., supra note 47, at 533. 
 84. Zhanhui Ou et al., The Combination of CRISPR/Cas9 and iPSC Technologies in the 
Gene Therapy of Human β-Thalassemia in Mice, 6 SCI. REP., no. 32463, Sept. 1, 2016, at 1, 
1. 
 85. Kim, supra note 40, at 1575–76; Shim et al., supra note 9, at 740; Yin et al., supra 
note 9, at 394. 
 86. Eric W. F. W. Alton et al., Correspondence, A Phase I/IIa Safety and Efficacy Study 
of Nebulized Liposome-Mediated Gene Therapy for Cystic Fibrosis Supports a Multidose 
Trial, 192 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1389, 1389–90 (2015). 
 87. Zeming Chen et al., Targeted Delivery of CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Cancer Gene 
Therapy via Liposome-Templated Hydrogel Nanoparticles, 27 ADVANCED FUNCTIONAL 
MATERIALS, no. 1703036, Oct. 16, 2017, at 1, 1–2. 
 88. See Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 638–40. 
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Nonetheless, the most widely used and studied gene delivery 
vehicles are viral vectors.89 Viruses, by their nature, have evolved ways 
to efficiently deliver their genetic payload to the cells; that is how all 
viruses operate, from the benign to the malignant.90 Viral vectors for 
gene therapy are differentiated by the form in which they carry their 
genetic material, widely known as the Baltimore classification system.91 
Viruses that use double-stranded DNA—like DNA found in the 
genome—are Class I.92 Some viruses that use single-stranded RNA—
like the Human Immunodeficiency Virus—are Class VI.93 But in all 
cases, the principle of using viruses for gene editing is the same: genetic 
material is inserted into a target cell and makes use of the cell’s own 
machinery to edit the cell’s genome.94 Further, many viral vectors—like 
Class VI viruses—make such modifications permanent.95 And despite 
billions of years of evolution and five decades of research, much about 
their manufacture, safety, and how the human body responds to their 
molecular machinery remains unknown.96 
D. Gene-Editing Vectors and Safety 
Although excitement about gene editing feels new and hopeful, 
gene editing as therapy has a long and checkered history, with 
significant safety issues arising from the vectors used.97 Adeno-
associated viral vectors (“AAVs”), for example, are among the most 
well-studied tools used in gene-therapy trials.98 While some attempts 
 
 89. See ADDGENE, VIRAL VECTORS 101: A DESKTOP RESOURCE 8 (2018) (ebook), 
https://info.addgene.org/sign-up-to-receive-addgenes-viral-vectors-101-ebook [https://perma.cc/
AY93-EKPY] (“One well-established and widely popular technology (that scientists love to 
discuss) is virus—specifically, using viruses as research tools.”). 
 90. Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 346 (“Viruses are highly evolved biological 
machines that efficiently gain access to host cells and exploit the cellular machinery to 
facilitate their replication.”). 
 91. LINDA BRUSLIND, MICROBIOLOGY 144 (2018), https://open.umn.edu/
opentextbooks/textbooks/microbiology-2017 [https://perma.cc/FJ65-3SJ6]; JANE FLINT ET 
AL., PRINCIPLES OF VIROLOGY 21 (4th ed. 2015). 
 92. BRUSLIND, supra note 91, at 144–45. 
 93. HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY §	6.3 (4th ed. 2000). 
 94. Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 346. 
 95. ADDGENE, supra note 89, at 105 (“Viruses of the Retroviridae or Retrovirus family, 
which includes the gamma-retrovirus and lentivirus genera, have the unique ability to 
integrate permanently into the host genome and thereby enable long-term stable gene 
expression.”). 
 96. See Yin et al., supra note 9, at 397. 
 97. Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 346 (“The science of gene therapy has a turbulent 
history.”). 
 98. Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 9, at 646. 
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with AAVs were successful, the most notable result was the first death 
of a gene-therapy clinical-trial volunteer. In a 1999 Phase I trial to study 
corrections to a significant metabolic disorder, one participant, Jesse 
Gelsinger, died shortly after administration of the vector and the 
replacement gene; he developed a severe immune reaction to the 
infusion.99 The tragedy laid bare a host of ethical shortcomings of first-
in-human gene-editing trials, including overzealous investigators, 
financial conflicts of interest, improper informed consent, and 
insufficient attention paid to preclinical data.100 It also demonstrated 
that one of gene editing’s principal dangers was not the delivered genes 
themselves but the vectors used to deliver them.101 
Other ex vivo gene-therapy trials carried out in Severe Combined 
Immunodeficiency Disease (“SCID”) patients experienced similar 
issues. The first trials suffered from limited efficacy; they made use of 
mouse-related viral vectors, which poorly engrafted the stem cells used 
for transformation.102 As a result, these early studies were written off 
as largely unsuccessful.103 Later attempts to improve efficacy had 
troubling results. Trials in France and the United Kingdom in 2000 
cured nine boys with SCID but caused leukemia in five children.104 The 
culprit, again, was the vector: a gamma retroviral vector (“g-RV”) used 
in the study inserted its genetic payload within an oncogene. This gene, 
when disrupted, increases the body’s propensity to develop cancer.105 
“These events precipitated what is recognized as the field’s 
nadir.”106 Though no participants in the U.S. retroviral trials suffered 
adverse events, in 2003 the FDA halted twenty-seven other gene-
therapy trials.107 The tendencies of certain viruses like g-RVs to cause 
 
 99. Nikunj Somia & Inder M. Verma, Gene Therapy: Trials and Tribulations, 1 
NATURE REV.: GENETICS 91, 95 (2000). 
 100. James M. Wilson, Lessons Learned from the Gene Therapy Trial for Ornithine 
Transcarbamylase Deficiency, 96 MOLECULAR GENETICS & METABOLISM 151, 153–56 
(2009). 
 101. See David A. Williams & Adrian J. Thrasher, Concise Review: Lessons Learned 
from Clinical Trials of Gene Therapy in Monogenic Immunodeficiency Diseases, 3 STEM 
CELLS TRANSLATIONAL MED. 636, 637 (2014). 
 102. Thomas et al., supra note 28, at 355. 
 103. See id. 
 104. See Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 600–02; Williams & Thrasher, supra note 
101, at 636–37; see also Marina Cavazzana-Calvo et al., Gene Therapy of Human Severe 
Combined Immunodeficiency (SCID)-X1 Disease, 288 SCIENCE 669, 669–70 (2000); Salima 
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Linked Severe Combined Immunodeficiency, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 255, 255 (2003). 
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 107. Id. at 604. 
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cancer, combined with the death of Jesse Gelsinger, led to a massive 
retreat from gene-therapy development.108 By the early 2000s, simply 
the term “‘gene therapy’ took on a more negative connotation as a 
dangerous and unproven technology.”109 
The recent elucidation of gene-editing technologies, however, has 
reinvigorated interest in “gene therapy,” even while the safety of their 
concomitant vectors remains unproven. One recent gene-therapy 
trial—one of the first since the FDA’s 2003 stop order—resulted in the 
vector-related death of several clinical trial subjects.110 Another gene-
therapy trial similarly killed yet another clinical trial subject.111 
Nonetheless, gene editing—with or without safe vectors—now 
continues apace.112 
Besides toxicity—the likely culprit of some trial subjects’ gene-
editing deaths—gene editing and its attendant vectors raise three 
principal safety concerns: mosaicism, efficiency, and off-target effects. 
Mosaicism is the effect of gene-editing technologies only editing some 
of the target cells in a given tissue.113 This creates a mosaic of edited 
and unedited cells, the persistence of which is unclear.114 Recently, 
Chinese scientists attempted the CRISPR technique in viable human 
embryos and managed to correct gene mutations half the time. 
However, the study revealed that one of two edited embryos was a 
mosaic—a mixture of edited and unedited cells. It appears that 
CRISPR made repairs after DNA replication so that when the single-
 
 108. See Sherkow et al., supra note 79, at 4. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Laura DeFrancesco, CAR-Ts Forge Ahead, Despite Juno Deaths, 35 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 6, 6 (2017). 
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BIOPHARMADIVE (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.biopharmadive.com/news/cellectis-cart-
trial-death-clinical-hold/504185/ [https://perma.cc/H7QV-VMV5]. 
 112. See François Baylis & Marus McLeod, First-in-Human Phase 1 CRISPR Gene 
Editing Cancer Trials: Are We Ready?, 17 CURRENT GENE THERAPY 309, 309 (2017); 
DeFrancesco, supra note 110, at 6; Catherine Offord, US Companies Launch CRISPR 
Clinical Trial, SCIENTIST (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.the-scientist.com/news-opinion/us-
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First CRISPR Clinical Trial Gets Green Light from US Panel, NATURE (June 22, 2018), 
https://www.nature.com/news/first-crispr-clinical-trial-gets-green-light-from-us-panel-1.20137 
[https://perma.cc/R37U-LFWQ]. 
At the same time, the difficult ethical problems—such as investigative zeal, 
professional and institutional conflicts of interest, proper informed consent, and inattention 
to preclinical evidence—that plagued first-generation gene therapies were again raised as 
expert groups pondered recommendations for the first U.S. ex vivo CRISPR clinical trial. 
Baylis & McLeod, supra, at 309. 
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celled embryos continued to divide, some of the daughter cells 
inherited unrepaired DNA.115 Other groups have reduced levels of 
mosaicism by carefully timing the addition of the enzyme during 
fertilization or certain phases of cell division, or by shortening the half-
life of the Cas9 protein.116 
Editing efficiency is another stumbling block. In a 2015 study, only 
14.3% of nonviable human embryos were edited.117 Since then, vector 
efficiencies have improved somewhat.118 The controversial Chinese 
experiment that produced engineered human babies underscored 
these two shortcomings of efficiency: the twins were both mosaics, and 
one was incompletely edited, with cuts in one chromosome but not 
another.119 Other work identified a potential flaw in the editing process, 
which leaves cells “transiently vulnerable to the introduction of 
chromosomal rearrangements and other [cancer-causing] 
mutations.”120 Selecting cells whose DNA has been modified by 
CRISPR, it seems, may also select cells with a mutated cancer-
suppressor gene.121 And now it is known that CRISPR can produce on-
target effects, causing large deletions and gene shuffling.122 After 
editing, imperfections in the cell’s repair mechanism can rearrange 
segments of DNA or incorporate unwanted stretches of DNA into the 
chromosome.123 
Finally, detecting off-target events—when the nucleases mutate 
unintended stretches of DNA—will be essential to any calculation of 
clinical readiness. Various methods have emerged for detecting and 
measuring off-target mutations, including genome-wide profiling in 
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bulk populations of cells.124 Other strategies include minimizing off-
target mutations by improving genome-wide specificity of 
CRISPR/Cas9.125 
It is important to note that these experiments, and others designed 
to optimize the eventual clinical use of CRISPR and other genome-
editing technologies, will likely require the use of many thousands of 
human embryos. The use of scarce and morally fraught resources such 
as unwanted, donated embryos from IVF clinics and embryos made 
expressly for research were dominant features of the human 
embryonic-stem-cell debate.126 These controversies will continue as 
CRISPR-mediated approaches march toward the clinic. As an 
example, the CRISPR study on viable embryos conducted at Oregon 
Health Sciences University used hundreds of embryos during the 
course of the experiments.127 Taken together, these reports and others 
underscore the dangers of a rush to the clinic for both in vivo and ex 
vivo applications—including those reported in China and trials 
contemplated in other countries.128 
How are these safety risks being weighed in new gene-editing 
trials? There are several places to look for clues, including the National 
Institute of Health’s (“NIH”) Recombinant DNA Advisory 
Committee (“RAC”) clinical trial approvals database.129 Until August 
of 2018, the RAC reviewed gene-editing experiments in somatic 
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cells.130 Prior to its diminishment, the RAC database listed eleven gene-
editing protocols: one concerning CRISPR, seven for ZFNs, and none 
for TALENs.131 Another database that may provide clues as to the 
trials and vectors being used for gene editing are investigational new 
drug applications (“INDs”) filed with the FDA.132 For gene-editing 
trials to cure inherited diseases, the FDA has approved several INDs 
for leukemia, using lentiviral vectors, and β-thalassemia, using AAVs. 
At the same time, the FDA has placed “clinical holds” on other sickle 
cell and Duchenne muscular dystrophy programs using AAVs.133 The 
FDA, meanwhile, has approved gene therapies for retinal blindness—
Luxturna, an AAV therapy—and two products for leukemia, one using 
lentiviruses and the other using retroviruses.134 
Beyond these resources are listings of clinical trials currently being 
conducted, mainly housed at NIH’s Clinical Trials website.135 Simple 
keyword searches yield twenty-four CRISPR trials (thirteen in China, 
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ten in the United States, and one in Germany);136 two TALENs studies 
(both in China);137 and fourteen ZFN trials (ten in the United States, 
three in China, and one in Australia).138 In the last case, it is interesting 
to note that China is taking an aggressive approach to developing 
CRISPR therapies, while the United States seems to be exhibiting 
more caution.139 Whether this is due to safety concerns related to 
vectors or intellectual property issues regarding ZFNs as a first-
generation editing platform remains unclear. Finally, NIH requires all 
funded academic and research institutions to review all experiments 
involving human subjects through Institutional Review Boards 
(“IRBs”).140 How these IRBs will assess safety issues related to vectors 
is also an open question. Will they equate the risks of the gene-editing 
protocols themselves with the risks—and tragic outcomes—seen by 
early iterations of their vectors? Advances in the technology may have 
shifted the risk-benefit profile of gene-editing technologies, but 
memories of their failures are long and poignant.141 As with mines in 
the Gold Rush, there is no single hand to police the safety of gene-
editing vectors.142 But more information about their mechanisms seems 
better than less. 
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II.  THE GENE-EDITING VECTOR PICK-AND-SHOVEL PLAY 
A. Secrecy in Pick-and-Shovel Plays 
Today, a pick-and-shovel business simply means “a company that 
sells products needed for a larger, overarching industry to operate.”143 
Businesses that sell pressurized tanks for the storage of natural gas, for 
example, provide “picks and shovels” to the otherwise highly volatile 
natural gas industry.144 Internet server storage and processing—
Amazon Web Services, for example—sells pick-and-shovel equipment 
and services to internet companies.145 And industrial manufacturers of 
chemicals—needed for a host of industries—could also be considered 
pick-and-shovel operations.146 In finance, pick-and-shovel businesses 
are widely believed to be safe if not profitable investments as long as 
the overarching technology is commonly used and there is a constant 
demand for materials and know-how to implement it.147 
This rather mundane sector of business operations belies a more 
canny history of its namesake’s origins—and why, of all pieces of 
equipment, picks and shovels are tools after which it is named. In 1848, 
near Sutter’s Mill, California, Samuel Brannan—newspaper publisher, 
Mormon exile, and general store owner—noticed that workers from a 
nearby sawmill were keen to purchase Brannan’s mining equipment.148 
After pressing them as to their interest, one teamster produced a 
pocket of gold dust found at Coloma on the American River outside of 
Sacramento.149 At that moment, Brannan seized on an idea, one of the 
greatest singular acts of capitalistic zeal in American history: he would 
simultaneously publicize the existence of gold in the Coloma-Lotus 
Valley and, owning the only store for dozens of miles around, sell the 
equipment needed to pan it.150 Brannan commissioned several letters 
 
 143. Stutman, supra note 11. 
 144. Picks and Shovels for Natural Gas: These 3 Companies Will Make Money, SEEKING 
ALPHA (Apr. 20, 2012, 11:53 AM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/513861-picks-and-
shovels-for-natural-gas-these-3-companies-will-make-money [https://perma.cc/PSZ5-VJLY]. 
 145. James Barnes, What’s Your Pick-and-Shovel Play of 2017?, MEDIUM (Sept. 26, 
2017), https://medium.com/@JamesBarnesEsq/whats-your-pick-and-shovel-play-of-2017-
5a7c3a594e87 [https://perma.cc/FP92-GM6U]. 
 146. Kraft, supra note 12. 
 147. See Stutman, supra note 11 (“[I]nternal component providers are the foundation of 
everything you see and experience on the surface. Without them, the industry simply 
wouldn’t exist, which makes them incredibly secure from the standpoint of demand.”). 
 148. Watson, supra note 13, at 299. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Bringhurst, supra note 14, at 145 (“Before Brannan allowed word of the discovery 
to leak out, the enterprising businessman scoured northern California purchasing and 
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to the editor in newspapers around the United States about the gold 
find and California’s mild climate—“the forerunner of all California 
promotion literature.”151 And, later, as business picked up, Brannan 
“[r]ush[ed] into San Francisco’s Plaza[,] .	.	. doffed his broad-brimmed 
black hat, and holding aloft a bottle of glittering particles in his left 
hand, he bellowed in his great bull voice: ‘GOLD! GOLD! GOLD! 
From the American River!’ The Gold Rush was born that instant.”152 
Back at his store, Brannan purchased cheap metal pans from every 
possible retailer and wholesaler in the United States.153 Retailing for 
20¢ each, Brannan sold them to desperate miners for $15 dollars. 
Miners, not knowing where else to buy the necessary equipment for 
their endeavors, gladly paid.154 At the operation’s peak, Brannan was 
netting “$150,000 a month in business”—$4.8 million today.155 Brannan 
quickly became the richest man in California, purchasing virtually all 
of Calistoga, California; funding the Mexican Revolution of 1860; and, 
in a tale apt for a story about the Gold Rush, dying “a penniless 
drunkard—shunned by his former friends and forgotten by his 
enemies.”156 All from selling picks and shovels. 
There are many good lessons to be learned from Brannan’s tale 
about marketing, pricing, and cornering a hot market. But like 
Brannan’s knowledge about wholesalers of mining equipment, at the 
core of most good pick-and-shovel plays lies secrecy.157 If miners 
possessed the same knowledge as Brannan on where to purchase tin 
pans, Brannan would not have been able to sell them at a 7400% 
markup. 
This axiom is instructive about the relationship between modern-
day pick-and-shovel companies and secrecy. Older theories of the firm 
 
stocking his store with any and all merchandise of any conceivable use to the gold seekers.”). 
Indeed, prior to Brannan’s announcement, “it was not the social custom [in California] for 
miners to share information of a gold strike.” Douglas W. Allen, Information Sharing 
During the Klondike Gold Rush, 67 J. ECON. HIST. 944, 961 (2007). Interestingly, Douglas 
W. Allen chalks up the difference between information sharing during the California and 
Klondike gold rushes to the absence and presence, respectively, of institutionalized property 
norms. Id. at 946–47. 
 151. Watson, supra note 13, at 300. 
 152. Id. at 301. 
 153. MARTIN, supra note 13, at 21 n.9. 
 154. See id. 
 155. Bringhurst, supra note 14, at 145; see also U.S. Inflation Rate, $150,000 in 1848 to 
2018, CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, https://www.officialdata.org/1848-dollars-in-
2018?amount=150000 [https://perma.cc/RV5A-SLNU]. 
 156. Bringhurst, supra note 14, at 140. 
 157. See supra note 10. 
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suggest that the size and cohesiveness of a company is defined by 
transaction costs.158 But in truth, these costs have as much to do with 
tacit knowledge—know-how—as price efficiency.159 In this sense, pick-
and-shovel plays are forms of “informational arbitrage”: keeping secret 
information developed from one source to use it more profitably on 
another source.160 This is analogous to the most classic form of 
arbitrage, currency arbitrage, where sellers purchase currency from 
one market and sell it in another, taking advantage of a difference in 
price across markets.161 In some circumstances, the same applies to 
physical goods that are both standardized and resalable: oil, precious 
metals, and even corn may be utilized for “physical arbitrage.”162 But 
in all of these cases, the core of arbitrage remains secrecy: once 
information about price differences becomes public knowledge, sellers 
demand higher prices, purchasers demand lower prices, and 
competitors drive profit margins to efficiency levels, i.e., close to zero. 
For this reason, “arbitrageurs do not share all their knowledge with 
investors, and cultivate secrecy to protect their knowledge from 
imitation.”163 So do vector developers. 
B. The Pick-and-Shovel Play, Gene-Editing Vectors, and Patents 
Like tin pans, natural gas storage, or cloud computing resources, 
the business of gene-editing vectors constitutes a form of the pick-and-
shovel play. Developers of gene-editing vectors provide tools, 
resources, and a great deal of technical know-how to companies more 
concerned with developing gene therapies than the viruses and 
 
 158. R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394–95 (1937). 
 159.  Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and 
Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1545 (2012) 
(“In light of market failure, organizational integration emerges as a viable option for 
conveying tacit knowledge, even in the presence of patents.”). 
 160. See Chau et al., supra note 10, at 2–3 (defining “informational arbitrage”). 
 161. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 10, at 35–36. 
 162. See, e.g., Andrew Coleman, Storage, Transport and the Law of One Price: Theory 
with Evidence from Nineteenth Century U.S. Corn Markets, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 332, 
332 (2009); André Plourde & G.C. Watkins, Crude Oil Prices Between 1985 and 1994: How 
Volatile in Relation to Other Commodities?, 20 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 245, 247 
(1998). 
 163. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 10, at 40; see also Anokhin & Wincent, supra note 10, 
at 440 n.6 (“[E]ffective information exchange may even be purposefully sabotaged by 
innovator firms that try to exploit the better resource combinations by pursuing a 
‘monopolistic excess of price over cost.’”). 
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liposomes packaging their breakthroughs.164 And like Brannan himself, 
gene-editing vector companies advertise their wares through 
promotional literature and conference presentations, to be sure, but 
also through patents.165 
Patents, among other forms of advertising, allow vector companies 
to disclose their technology to others while, like Brannan, fending off 
competition.166 But these disclosures are often incomplete, providing 
just enough information about the vector’s basic contours to 
understand them but not enough to move the technology in-house.167 
It is true that this seems to violate patent law’s statutory requirement 
that inventions must be sufficiently disclosed in patent specifications to 
enable others to “make and use the same.”168 Also true: this double 
protection runs against the maxim that inventors must choose between 
protecting their inventions through patents or trade secrets, but not 
both.169 But, as scholars have long noted, patent law’s disclosure 
requirement is increasingly honored only in the breach,170 and 
“layering” patent protection with trade secrecy—the mutually 
 
 164. See, e.g., Nicole Faust, Addressing the Challenges of Commercial-Scale Viral Vector 
Production, 4 CELL & GENE THERAPY INSIGHTS 31, 31–32 (2018) (describing the services 
provided by viral developer CEVEC). 
 165. E.g., Press Release, CEVEC, CEVEC Intensifies Its Marketing Activities, 
Presenting at Various Renowned Scientific Conferences in Europe and the US (Feb. 22, 
2016), https://cevec.com/news/press-releases/cevec-intensifies-its-marketing-activities/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q8KZ-6GGC]; About Us, supra note 24; Gene Therapy: Intellectual 
Property, supra note 22; see also Jason Rantanen & Sarah E. Jack, Patents as Credentials, 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1–4), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3013780 [http://perma.cc/MP6N-7UV3] (discussing the 
reputational incentives behind patenting and patent advertising). 
 166. Anderson, supra note 36, at 1593 (“Companies use their patents as a type of 
advertising, extolling the virtues of a product or company.”); Ann Bartow, Separating 
Marketing Innovation from Actual Invention: A Proposal for a New, Improved, Lighter, and 
Better-Tasting Form of Patent Protection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 1, 3 (2000) 
(“[P]atents may be good marketing tools (irrespective of the specific inventions they 
define), they may enhance the image of the patenting entity (creating an aura of creativity 
and technological proficiency), and they may add fiber to patent portfolios.”); Dan L. Burk, 
Patent Silences, 69 VAND. L. REV. 1603, 1627 (2016) (“Some view [a patent] as a marketing 
asset or as an advertising feature.”). 
 167. See Burk, supra note 166, at 1628 (“[P]atent doctrine preserves multiple spaces in 
which patents remain[] silent, maintaining ambiguities that may be satisfied or imbued with 
meanings as needed at different points in the life of the document. The patent provides a 
natural point of mediation, which largely occurs in the interstices between the local 
meanings of the document’s disclosure.”); Lee, supra note 159, at 1545. 
 168. 35 U.S.C. §	112(a) (2012). 
 169. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1774 
(2016) (“Inventors face a stark choice between two intellectual property systems of 
protecting innovative ideas: patents and trade secrecy.”). 
 170. See id. at 1781–83. 
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exclusive nature of the two protections notwithstanding—seems to be 
the modern state of affairs.171 
For vector developers, the layering of patenting with trade secrecy 
provides developers with a higher quantum of protection than either 
patents or pure secrecy would alone: insufficiently disclosed patents, 
without a primer to the technology’s know-how, are unlikely to attract 
high prices or attention.172 Nor are they likely to require the continual 
reengagement of the patent-holding firm.173 Perfectly disclosed patents, 
meanwhile, are likely to be victims of their own success by informing 
potential purchasers how to invent around them. And secrecy alone is 
unlikely to assuage potential purchasers’ fears of the patented 
technology’s replicability or reliability.174 Patents in this sense operate 
as a form of informational arbitrage: informational assets obtained 
through the company’s own research that, although disclosed, are 
nonetheless restricted to command higher prices elsewhere.175 
Take, for example, uniQure’s Vector Delivery System.176 By its 
own account, uniQure makes a “modular technology platform” 
utilizing AAVs that in theory could be used with virtually any 
therapeutic gene cassette desired by licensed developers, such as 
Bristol-Myers Squibb.177 To encourage developers to partner with it, 
uniQure discloses substantial aspects of its system both through its 
patents and through investor and partner communications.178 For 
example, uniQure has patented methods of using its technology in 
 
 171. Id. at 1774 n.21; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491–92 
(1974) (noting that patent protection does not readily conflict with—nor preempt—state 
law patent protections). At the same time, there is the possibility that the “tying” of a slate 
of products protected by both trade secrets and patents may be violative of the antitrust 
laws; that is, simply, outside the scope of this Article. 
 172. See Lee, supra note 159, at 1545. 
 173. See infra Section IV.C. 
 174. See infra Section IV.B. 
 175. Cf. Anokhin & Wincent, supra note 10, at 439 (describing this in the context of 
informational arbitrage based on technical knowledge); Gray, supra note 10, at 4 
(“According to efficient market logic, the rational arbitrager should act alone, drive the 
price to the fundamental level, and reap all the rewards of the arbitrage he has found.” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
 176. uniQure’s Technology, supra note 21. 
 177. Id.; About: Partners, UNIQURE, http://www.uniqure.com/about/partners.php 
[https://perma.cc/FEN2-SZAN]. 
 178. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 9,988,645 (disclosing a method of AAV preparation); U.S. 
Patent No. 9,885,022 (disclosing another method of AAV preparation); U.S. Patent No. 
9,840,694 (disclosing a method of AAV purification); Investors & Newsroom: Events & 
Presentations, UNIQURE, http://uniqure.com/investors-newsroom/events-presentations.php 
[https://perma.cc/D4A9-9K5F] (listing uniQure’s investor communications). 
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certain cell lines and further advertises its system as using one specific 
AAV variant—AAV5—that uniQure claims is more effective than 
other technologies.179 But a substantial quantity of information about 
uniQure’s manufacturing and development processes remains 
unknown such that gene-editing companies interested in using 
uniQure’s technology have little choice but to partner with the 
company directly.180 These gaps in the information disclosed by 
uniQure include the sequences of uniQure’s AAV5 construct itself—
important in assessing various safety aspects of uniQure’s platform.181 
MaxCyte is another vector company that markets a “patented, 
high-performance cell-engineering platform” for the development of 
various aspects of gene therapy.182 According to MaxCyte, their 
“platform offers the potential to deliver therapy to the patient in a 
fraction of the time with less complexity of other autologous [chimeric 
antigen T-cells (“CAR-T”)] products .	 .	 . due to a more streamlined 
manufacturing process without the complexity of virus-based 
products.”183 MaxCyte’s patents, meanwhile, disclose an 
electroporation technique using stably transfected mRNA, rather than 
DNA, to express the recombinant proteins needed to engage in CAR-
T work.184 One would be forgiven, therefore, for thinking that such 
patents sufficiently disclosed MaxCyte’s technology to potential 
licensees. But MaxCyte’s patents elide over important details such as 
sequence listings and manufacturing details of its electroporation 
 
 179. Gene Therapy: Hemophilia, UNIQURE, http://uniqure.com/gene-therapy/
hemophilia.php [https://perma.cc/3SEJ-RS7Y] (“We believe these factors contribute to 
making AAV5 a potential best-in-class vector for delivering gene therapies more effectively 
and safely to a greater portion of patients in need of treatment.”). 
 180. UNIQURE N.V., supra note 23, at 16 (“[S]ignificant aspects of the process by which 
we manufacture our gene therapies are based on unpatented trade secrets and know-how. 
We seek to protect our proprietary technology and processes and obtain and maintain 
ownership of certain technologies, in part, through confidentiality agreements and invention 
assignment agreements with our employees, consultants, scientific advisors, contractors and 
commercial collaborator[s].”). 
 181. See Irene Gil-Farina et al., Improving AAV Gene Therapy Safety Analysis: 
Multiplex LAM-PCR Provide New Insights into AAV Vector Integration, 23 MOLECULAR 
THERAPY (SUPP. 1) S264, S264 (2015) (cataloging some AAV5 safety issues). 
 182. About Us, supra note 24. 
 183. CARMA Platform, MAXCYTE, https://www.maxcyte.com/car/car-platform/ 
[https://perma.cc/H3SK-GXM2]. 
 184. U.S. Patent No. 9,669,058 (“Certain embodiments involve the use of 
electroporation to facilitate the entry of one or more nucleic acid molecules into cells of the 
immune system, such as natural killer (NK) cells.”). 
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technologies.185 This is, of course, proprietary information, allowing 
MaxCyte to advertise its product as “patented” even while failing to 
disclose precisely how it works. 
Spark Therapeutics provides yet another example of a gene-
therapy company wishing to establish itself at the forefront of “vector 
design,” the DNA sequences that enable vectors to operate safely and 
permanently.186 To demonstrate their vector’s potential to licensees, 
Spark chose perhaps an unorthodox route: it sought and received FDA 
approval for a gene-therapy product of its own, Luxturna, an AAV 
therapy indicated to treat a rare form of genetic blindness.187 In an 
effort to further entice and inform partners, Spark has filed several 
pending patent applications describing components of its vector 
technology.188 But regulatory filings note that Spark also quietly makes 
use of a trade-secreted platform, Selecta Biosciences’ SVP platform, to 
ensure the safety of Spark’s vectors.189 These are critical for Spark’s 
vector technology: Selecta’s SVP platform is designed to mitigate the 
potential for overactive immune responses to the viral vector used by 
Spark, lessening the likelihood that patients suffer extreme—and in 
some cases fatal—immune attacks.190 Precisely how such technology 
works with Spark’s platform, however, is unknown despite the FDA’s 
approval of Luxturna and Spark’s patents seemingly disclosing its 
technology.191 
These lacunae in vector developers’ patents and technical 
disclosures are significant given the recent, almost insatiable interest in 
gene editing; not much information is needed to froth investor interest 
 
 185. See, e.g., id. (claiming methods of modifying certain cells with mRNA, without 
disclosing specific mRNA sequences); U.S. Patent No. 9,132,153 (same); U.S. Patent No. 
8,450,112 (same). 
 186. See BioSci Capital Partners, Rounds Report: Spark Therapeutics Ironically Topped 
Our Featured List Despite Its Depreciation, SEEKING ALPHA (Aug. 8, 2016), 
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4196276-rounds-report-spark-therapeutics-ironically-topped-
featured-list-despite-depreciation [https://perma.cc/UA8J-FS8M] (“The company is 
leveraging on the cutting-edge viral vector design via adeno-associated virus.”). 
 187. Luxturna, supra note 134. 
 188. U.S. Patent Application No. 20,180,135,097 (filed Nov. 7, 2017); U.S. Patent 
Application No. 20,170,216,408 (filed Mar. 17, 2017). 
 189. Selecta Biosciences, Inc., supra note 26, at 47; Spark Therapeutics, Inc., supra note 
26, at 19. 
 190. SVP™ for Immune Tolerance, SELECTA BIOSCIENCES, http://selectabio.com/
platform/svp-for-immune-tolerance/ [https://perma.cc/A7PR-AMCE]. 
 191. See Spark Therapeutics, Inc., supra note 26, at 19.  
97 N.C. L. REV. 1497 (2019) 
2019] PICKS AND SHOVELS OF VECTOR PATENTS 1529 
 
and massage fears of past failures.192 The vector-platform industry has 
responded to this demand by touting efforts to develop a new 
generation of vectors with better efficacy, higher potency, and reduced 
integration problems.193 In developing g-RVs, for example, industry 
efforts included removing sequences that would detrimentally activate 
nearby genes.194 This was an important first step in the field; later 
studies showed that these so-called self-inactivating (“SIN”) viruses 
improved safety in SCID therapy.195 At the same time, the possibility 
that SIN g-RVs could integrate into promoter regions of genes 
provided the impetus for the development of a different type of gene 
ferry, lentiviral vectors (“LVs”).196 LVs do not readily integrate in 
nearby genes, thus reducing the probability of “insertional 
mutagenesis”—the mutation of genes through the accidental 
“insertion” of the vector’s payload.197 Newly engineered versions of 
LVs are, in theory, transcriptionally inactive; many are used in some 
ongoing gene-therapy trials.198 And AAVs have perhaps become the 
most widely used gene-therapy interventions to date with over 173 
clinical trials recorded in 2017 alone.199 As with Spark’s use of Selecta’s 
SVP platform, however, host immune response to AAVs remains a 
major obstacle.200 Finally, CAR-T therapies, using retroviral vectors in 
an ex vivo setting, have emerged as a potential treatment for malignant 
cancers.201 And even despite some fatal failures in the CAR-T 
 
 192. See Max Nisen, Playing with Crispr, Investors Get Burned, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 
2018, 4:21 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-06-11/crispr-gene-editing-
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 193. Naldini, supra note 39, at 351. 
 194. S. Hacein-Bey-Abina et al., A Modified γ-Retrovirus Vector for X-Linked Severe 
Combined Immunodeficiency, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1407, 1407–08 (2014). 
 195. Id. at 1408. 
 196. See NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 225 (discussing 
integrase-defective lentiviral vectors); Shim et al., supra note 9, at 744 fig.4. 
 197. Melissa A. Kotterman, Thomas W. Chalberg & David V. Schaffer, Viral Vectors for 
Gene Therapy: Translational and Clinical Outlook, 17 ANN. REV. BIOMEDICAL 
ENGINEERING 63, 65–68 (2015). To be clear, naturally occurring LVs do carry the risk of 
insertional mutagenesis, but this is likely due to a single virally encoded gene, integrase, 
that, once removed, strongly mitigates this effect. Id. at 67–68. 
 198. See Daniela Cesana et al., Uncovering and Dissecting the Genotoxicity of Self-
Inactivating Lentiviral Vectors In Vivo, 22 MOLECULAR THERAPY 774, 774 (2014). 
 199. DiCarlo et al., supra note 9, at 15. 
 200. Roberto Calcedo & James M. Wilson, Humoral Immune Response to AAV, 4 
FRONTIERS IMMUNOLOGY, no. 341, Oct. 18, 2013, at 1, 1; Nelson & Gersbach, supra note 
9, at 646–47. 
 201. Yin et al., supra note 9, at 391–92. 
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space202—the equivalent of a mine collapse, if you will—CAR-T 
development rapidly continues, with Gilead acquiring Kite 
Pharmaceuticals203 and Novartis also investing heavily in the 
technology.204 Like early advertisements for the Gold Rush, the 
potential for vectors’ success seems to paint a much rosier picture than 
can be readily ascertained from patents’ literature. And advertisements 
of safety, efficacy, and potential treatment and cures, as we have 
learned from other frontier biotechnologies, raise significant bioethical 
concerns. 
III.  BIOETHICS OF VECTOR PICK-AND-SHOVEL PLAYS 
This combination of patents and the pick-and-shovel play in the 
gene-editing vector space raises several specific ethical issues. Vector 
patents’ partial technical disclosures add uncertainty to patients’ and 
research subjects’ medical risk, especially for viral vectors. It also 
perpetuates risky clinical trials on shaky foundations of preclinical 
evidence. The vector pick-and-shovel play also complicates issues of 
informed consent between patients and clinicians. And assuming 
therapies are approved by the FDA using a partially secretive vector 
as a backbone, this may ultimately drive up costs, exacerbating access 
and affordability issues currently plaguing advanced therapies.205 
Vector developers’ employment of pick-and-shovel strategies may be 
good for business, but they stand counter to some core principles of 
bioethics. 
 
 202. DeFrancesco, supra note 110, at 6; Roni Dengler, Cancer Immunotherapy Company 
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A. Uncertain Risk 
Any human testing of a new medical technology has inherent 
risk.206 But with enough technical information about the technology 
itself, such risk can—at least ideally—be quantified and managed.207 
Typically, clinicians engage in such analyses by using empirical data to 
assess the clinical effectiveness of a given intervention and weigh that 
effectiveness against the potential harm by treatment.208 This requires 
some detailed knowledge about the mechanism of the intervention 
itself; it is difficult to quantify a treatment’s potential risk if it is unclear 
how the treatment works.209 Failures to appreciate the molecular 
mechanisms behind certain treatments have led to spectacular failures 
in medicine.210 
Partial and incomplete technical disclosures for certain gene-
editing vectors—in combination with their adoption by the field—
makes the risk of many potential gene-editing therapies uncertain. 
Those advising potential clinical trial subjects may not know in which 
cell lines the subject vectors are produced, important for 
immunogenicity studies.211 If the sequence of the vector is unknown, 
clinicians may similarly be unaware of the risks of oncogenic genomic 
 
 206. See, e.g., M.J.H. Kenter & A.F. Cohen, Establishing Risk of Human 
Experimentation with Drugs: Lessons from TGN1412, 368 LANCET 1387, 1387 (2006) 
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 207. See A. Brett Hauber, Angelyn O. Fairchild & F. Reed Johnson, Quantifying 
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Literature, 11 APPLIED HEALTH ECONS. & HEALTH POL’Y 319, 319, 325 (2013) 
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 208. Id. at 320. 
 209. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Black-Box Medicine, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 419, 
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of action). 
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Vaccines, 68 DRUGS 1483, 1486–87 (2008) (noting that GlaxoSmithKline uses a proprietary 
cell line for some influenza vaccine development); Jiemiao Hu & Shulin Li, Electroporation 
Formulation for Cell Therapy, in ELECTROPORATION PROTOCOLS 55, 57 (Shulin Li et al. 
eds., 2014) (“[A]s a trade secret, the components in each [proprietary electroporation] 
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line.”); Ana F. Rodrigues et al., Viral Vaccines and Their Manufacturing Cell Substrates: 
New Trends and Designs in Modern Vaccinology, 10 BIOTECHNOLOGY J. 1329, 1336 (2015) 
(recounting the history of PER.C6, the first proprietary “designer-cell substrate”). 
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integration.212 And if organ tropism is unknown—such as selective 
integration in the liver—this may increase organ toxicity in patients 
with already-damaged immune systems.213 This makes granular risk 
assessments—other than “kill or cure”—all but impossible.214 
This can be seen from a recent reset of the vector-design field that 
has experienced both startling successes and catastrophic failures. At 
the same hospital in France where X-linked SCID trials occurred 
nearly twenty years ago, clinicians recently transplanted engineered 
stem cells and apparently “cured” a teenager with sickle cell disease.215 
An in vivo trial using an AAV vector has similar effects on six of seven 
patients with severe Hemophilia A.216 And a 2018 β-thalassemia trial 
using LV-engineered stem cells reduced or stopped the need for blood 
transfusions in all twenty-two patients.217 
At the same time, issues concerning vectors and manufacturing—
the bulk of which remain trade secrets despite being patented—are 
likely responsible for a spate of deaths in trials advancing CAR-T.218 A 
gene-therapy trial sponsored by Juno Therapeutics resulted in the 
deaths of five clinical trial subjects, all from toxicities likely related to 
the treatment itself.219 While the ultimate cause of such toxicities 
remains unclear, the likely culprit stems from a portion of the vector 
construct used to create Juno’s therapy—something called the 
costimulatory domain.220 Cellectis, another company developing 
 
 212. See, e.g., Axel Schambach et al., Biosafety Features of Lentiviral Vectors, 24 HUM. 
GENE THERAPY 132, 133 (2013) (discussing the need to thoroughly understand the 
sequence of g-RVs to assess safety). 
 213. See Takehiro Ura, Kenji Okuda & Masaru Shimada, Developments in Viral Vector-
Based Vaccines, 2 VACCINES 624, 624 (2014). 
 214. See Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 600 (“Ex vivo γ-Moloney murine 
leukemia RV-mediated transfer of the γc-chain cDNA (common to several interleukin 
receptors) to autologous [hematopoietic stem cells] cured boys with X-linked SCID. 
However, four of ten children and one of ten children in a similar UK trial developed 
leukemia.”). 
 215. Jean-Antoine Ribeil et al., Gene Therapy in a Patient with Sickle Cell Disease, 376 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 848, 848–49 (2017). 
 216. See Savita Rangarajan et al., AAV5-Factor VII Gene Transfer in Severe Hemophilia 
A, 377 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2519, 2519 (2017). 
 217. Alexis A. Thompson et al., Gene Therapy in Patients with Transfusion-Dependent 
β-Thalassemia, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1479, 1479 (2018). 
 218. See supra Section II.B. 
 219. See DeFrancesco, supra note 110, at 6; Clara Rodríguez Fernández, A Cure for 
Cancer? How CAR-T Therapy Is Revolutionizing Oncology, LABIOTECH.EU (Jan. 16, 
2018), https://labiotech.eu/features/car-t-therapy-cancer-review/ [https://perma.cc/6X8F-
BGTU]. 
 220. Fernández, supra note 219; Mark Terry, A Look at the Deaths that Plagued Juno 
and Kite Pharma’s CAR-T Trials, BIOSPACE (June 29, 2017), https://www.biospace.com/
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products in the CAR-T space, similarly reported nine deaths from its 
trial “not related .	.	. to disease progression.”221 This is despite robust 
patenting from both Juno and Cellectis.222 These trials and travails 
underscore how individual disease, different delivery systems, and 
gene-transfer technology make the risk-benefit calculation difficult for 
these first-in-human trials.223 
This uncertainty of risk seems especially problematic in the 
context of gene-editing vectors because it allows the benefit side of the 
risk-benefit equation to increase while keeping the risk side dark. To 
date, gene-editing trials have justifiably focused on last-option patients 
with deadly disease.224 As a consequence, there are significant 
pressures to translate CRISPR and other gene-editing technologies to 
clinical applications—deeper understandings of how they’re 
introduced into cells be damned.225 Even with imperfect 
understandings of how gene-editing vectors work, this has changed the 
risk-benefit ratio for single-gene (i.e., “monogenic”) diseases that seem 
potentially curable but are otherwise deadly.226 This is especially true 
in developing countries with high health-care burdens, and even in 
developed countries, like the United States, with high health-care 
costs.227 Marina Cavazzana, head of biotherapy at the Necker Hospital 
for Sick Children in Paris where she conducts X-linked SCID trials, 
stated that “[i]f one compares the cost of gene therapy to conventional 
therapy and transplantation in economic terms, it is absolutely the least 
 
article/a-look-at-the-deaths-that-plagued-juno-and-kite-pharma-s-car-t-trials-/ [https://perma.cc/
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 221. See Terry, A Look at the Deaths, supra note 220. 
 222. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 7,446,190 (claiming specific CAR-T sequences); U.S. 
Patent No. 9,855,297 (claiming certain endonucleases for use in CAR-T preparation); U.S. 
Patent No. 9,890,393 (same). 
 223. See Robbins, supra note 202; Terry, Patient Dies, supra note 202. 
 224. See NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 47 (“First-in-human 
trials make compliance with [informed consent] provisions difficult, given that by definition, 
it is very difficult to assess the degree of uncertainty that pertains when research is moving 
from preclinical models to human interventions.”). 
 225. See Nicol et al., supra note 32, at 87. 
 226. See Luigi Naldini, Ex Vivo Gene Transfer and Correction for Cell-Based Therapies, 
12 NATURE REVIEWS: GENETICS 301, 301 (2011) (“[Monogenic diseases treated with] 
early-generation retroviral vectors, now provide a comprehensive analysis of a sizeable 
number of patients, allowing a reliable assessment of long-term immune system 
reconstitution and the risk/benefit ratio .	 .	 .	 . The verdict is favourable, with a clear long-
term therapeutic benefit evident in most treated patients despite the occurrence of vector-
related leukaemia in a few.”). 
 227. See Stuart H. Orkin & Philip Reilly, Paying for Future Success in Gene Therapy, 
352 SCIENCE 1059, 1060 (2016). 
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expensive system. It is a cure for patients, with no continued therapy, 
no immunosuppression, and no infections.”228 This assumes, of course, 
that deadly diseases are viewed as infinitely harmful, and discounts to 
zero—because they are unknown—the likely adverse events that may 
arise from aggressive treatment using less than well-characterized 
vectors. 
Patenting and secrecy issues for vectors notwithstanding, perhaps 
this calculus is ethically appropriate: Is the promise of the technology 
changing or just our perceptions of it? Like the CAR-T example, it is 
true that the first trials have killed some patients faster than the 
underlying disease otherwise would have. But the trials have also 
wonderfully cured others.229 Nonetheless, risk assessments for clinical 
trial subjects and patients should not be kept in the shadows. It does 
not excuse the hocking of the new technology’s vectors and the 
subsequent secreting away of important information about them. 
B. Insufficient Preclinical Evidence 
Some of the vector patents’ secrecy gap stems from structural 
issues in patent doctrine: patent law’s incentives—if not 
requirements—for early patenting.230 Patent law’s novelty 
requirement, for example, contains within it a series of “statutory 
bars,” prohibitions on developers patenting their own inventions if the 
inventions had been disclosed “in a printed publication, or in public 
use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public” for more than one 
year prior to filing a patent application.231 Beyond this legal 
requirement, developers engage in early patenting for traditional 
reasons having to do with competitive advantage and defensive 
strategy.232 
 
 228. See Scott & DeFrancesco, supra note 9, at 606. 
 229. E.g., Levine, supra note 28. 
 230. Christopher A. Cotropia, The Folly of Early Filing in Patent Law, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 
65, 93–96 (2009) (describing this phenomenon); Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility 
Paradox, supra note 31, at 883–84 (linking this to scientific irreproducibility). 
 231. See 35 U.S.C. §	102(a)(1), (b)(1) (2012); Robert P. Merges, Priority and Novelty 
Under the AIA, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1023, 1024–27 (2012) (discussing the statutory 
bars). 
 232. See, e.g., Stuart J.H. Graham et. al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent 
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1288 
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This means, however, that patents—even at their best—are 
frequently grounded in early-stage preclinical evidence, much of which 
is unlikely to be replicable.233 For some drugs, this means basing a 
patents’ claims on treating human therapy like small-sample-size 
animal trials.234 For gene-editing vectors, this means that patents are 
similarly filed early, long before any clinical trials have been run.235 
Whatever does end up disclosed may ultimately not work as claimed.236 
As a result, many of the safety issues arising from vector design are 
unlikely to be found out until long after patents have been filed. The 
clinical trial deaths from treatment studies obviously came as surprises 
to the companies themselves.237 Other problematic safety issues are 
likely more predictable, however, such as cellular “chimerism,” tissues 
with mixtures of genomic material,238 and off-target effects, changes to 
the code of genes not sought to be edited.239 Some of these can be 
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MAINTAINING BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 24 (2003), https://community-wealth.org/sites/
clone.community-wealth.org/files/downloads/book-hansen-vanFleet.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B7T7-DY7Y])). 
 233. See generally Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 31 
(exploring this phenomenon with four case studies). 
 234. E.g., In re ‘318 Patent Infringement Litig., 583 F.3d 1317, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(criticizing a patent’s basis on animal studies); Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility 
Paradox, supra note 31, at 890 (“[T]he basis for the ‘197 patent’s claims rests only on the 
thinnest reed of data: a preclinical, prophylactic trial in baboons—and even then, only ten 
baboons.”). 
 235. See U.S. Patent No. 9,132,153 (filed May 24, 2013) (MaxCyte’s Patent); U.S. Patent 
No. 8,450,112 (filed Apr. 9, 2009) (same); U.S. Patent No. 9,988,645 (filed Feb. 3, 2017) 
(uniQure’s patent); U.S. Patent No. 9,885,022 (filed Nov. 25, 2015) (same); U.S. Patent No. 
9,840,694 (filed Sept. 7, 2012) (same); U.S. Patent Application No. 20,180,135,097 (filed 
Nov. 7, 2017) (Spark Therapeutics’ patent application); U.S. Patent Application No. 
20,170,216,408 (filed Mar. 17, 2017) (same). 
 236. Cf. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 31, at 886–98 
(analyzing four case studies of this in the context of small molecule drugs).  
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 238. See Maria Pia Cicalese & Alessandro Aiuti, Clinical Applications for Gene Therapy 
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safety issues with partial chimerism). 
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especially concerning—some have the propensity to cause cancer and 
some cause large deletions of otherwise necessary genes.240 
As a consequence, vector developers file for patents covering their 
wares before they can reasonably know whether clinical trials will even 
be safe.241 This gives vector patents—along with corporate advertising 
of their technology’s patent protection—the false imprimatur of good 
technological disclosure useful for green lighting clinical trials.242 This 
unfortunately traffics on the current framework used for such analyses, 
which prioritizes technical disclosures, above all others, as sufficient for 
informed consent.243 In 2010, the bioethicist Jonathan Kimmelman 
developed a risk-assessment framework for novel gene therapies to 
help reviewers and investigators decide when the distance between 
preclinical and clinical research is sufficiently narrow to green light a 
first-in-human experiment.244 Under this framework, measurements of 
scientific validity—such as whether animal data are good 
representations of the human condition under study, the level of 
disclosures’ experimental reproducibility and replicability, a study’s 
statistical power, and tests of the vector platform—can give confidence 
to reviewers and oversight committees about whether to proceed.245 
Two Canadian researchers, François Baylis and Marcus McLeod, 
analyzed a RAC-approved Phase I CRISPR trial for cancer using the 
Kimmelman framework.246 Among other major concerns about the 
study’s validity, they found that investigators of the study did not 
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 241. See U.S. Patent No. 9,132,153 (filed May 24, 2013) (MaxCyte’s Patent); U.S. Patent 
No. 8,450,112 (filed Apr. 9, 2009) (same); U.S. Patent No. 9,988,645 (filed Feb. 3, 2017) 
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Paradox, supra note 31, at 886–98; supra text accompanying notes 235–36. 
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HUMAN RESEARCH: LOST IN TRANSLATION 40 (2010) (criticizing “[t]he tendency in 
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 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 110. 
 245. Id. at 117–24. 
 246. Baylis & McLeod, supra note 112, at 311. 
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sufficiently test the efficacy of the lentiviral delivery system.247 This led 
Baylis and McLeod to conclude that the move to a first-in-human 
CRISPR trial using the delivery system was “premature.”248 
Nonetheless, the eighteen-patient trial, approved by an academic IRB, 
continued to recruit patients.249 
To be clear, this rush to the clinic isn’t solely a function of patent 
law’s early, incomplete disclosure requirement. Rather, this example 
simply illustrates that gene-editing trials using unsafe vectors may—
and frequently do—commence with imperfect or insufficient 
preclinical data.250 Yet, patents—touted by vector developers to sell the 
novelty of their technologies—seem worse than nothing in their place 
in the Baylis-McLeod framework. A useful comparison, perhaps, can 
be made to stem cell research. Over the course of a decade or more, 
hundreds of patent disclosures complimented by a significant trove of 
basic and preclinical research led to greater degrees of certainty as stem 
cell interventions moved through trials into the clinic.251 Yet, early 
efforts in these areas suffered from ethical lapses, underfunding, 
moving too quickly, and, still, insufficient preclinical evidence.252 
There, at least, local, national, and international agencies moved 
quickly to set standards for clinical research, including emphasis on 
preclinical data and strong scientific rationales.253 In turn, the worth of 
stem cell patents has been muted.254 But in the case of CRISPR, the 
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move to the clinic has come barely five years after the first reported 
discoveries and with virtually no attention paid to the enabling half of 
the possible therapeutic agents—the vector systems.255 Pick-and-
shoveling vector patents in this regard risks moving from the bench to 
the clinic on an unstable bedrock. 
C. Opacity to Informed Consent 
The gene-editing vector pick-and-shovel play presents another 
issue concerning patient-subject autonomy: opacity to informed 
consent. Transparent and voluntary informed consent is an ethical 
cornerstone of medical research.256 Patients should be able to properly 
weigh the risks of experimental medicine based on their conversations 
with their physicians and make health decisions in line with their values 
and goals.257 Subjects of biomedical research, in partnership with their 
providers, should similarly decide whether the benefits of seeking an 
investigational treatment outweigh the risks.258 For a consent to be 
ethical and valid, the patient must be free to make a voluntary decision 
based on known and transparent information.259 
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SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH §	C.1 (1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT], https://www.hhs.gov/
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research-involving-human-subjects/ [https://perma.cc/BL5C-3L9Z] (setting out informed 
consent guidelines in paragraphs 25–32). 
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But if expert clinicians in the gene-therapy field are proceeding 
under a veil of opacity about the vectors used to mediate those 
therapies, informed consent turns fraught: How can providers—
without a full understanding of or access to all the available evidence—
properly obtain consent from their patients?260 The pick-and-shovel 
play for vector patents makes this especially problematic because it 
gives clinicians the appearance of transparency even while information 
about vector platforms is intentionally being secreted from trialists. 
Even if evidence about the nature of certain vectors could be presented 
adequately and clearly, and assuming a subject’s understanding of this 
information could be properly assessed, informed consent is still 
arguably lacking without full transparency about the delivery systems 
themselves. 
This opacity to obtaining informed consent arising from the vector 
pick-and-shovel play exacerbates several other ethical problems 
endemic to modern gene-editing technologies. First, it plays on 
patients’ susceptibility to overhyped portrayals of gene-editing 
technologies like CRISPR: gene-editing technologies are cures for 
genetic illnesses that are cheaper, easier, and more precise than other 
therapies.261 Such a view discounts, of course, the uncertainties about 
the vectors used to operate them or minimizes the difficulties 
encountered during the more than twenty years of refinement of 
vector-based gene therapies.262 
Second, it contributes to gene editing’s hype. In a series of national 
and international policy reports and peer-reviewed research, 
bioethicists and policy researchers raised questions about public 
understanding of genome editing.263 As a consequence, there is no clear 
path for how the public should be engaged to properly develop 
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genome-editing policy, a normative value behind most new 
technologies.264 How experts and the public should interact on crucial 
questions of clinical trials is also an open question.265 As a result, 
existing guidance and mechanisms of governance of genome editing 
may not adequately reflect public beliefs and values.266 The known and 
unknown risks of genome-editing technologies—including the 
attendant risks of vector technologies—must be communicated 
adequately if governance with public input is to be seriously 
considered.267 
Third, it contributes to a culture of rational ignorance on the part 
of clinicians regarding technical and safety hurdles that must be 
surmounted before trials can proceed.268 As discussed previously, 
essential to any assessment of risk for first-in-human trials is an 
exhaustive evaluation of the preclinical evidence.269 Though new gene-
editing vectors are often portrayed as a quantum leap over first 
generation technologies, several major questions concerning the 
technology’s safety even in the preclinical validation phase are still 
unresolved.270 The pick-and-shovel play, however, is likely to 
contribute to a physician’s determination that such concerns are 
unknowable, simply because vector developers have chosen to guard 
their platforms as secret.271 
D. Increased Costs 
Lastly, patents covering important vectors have the ability to—
indeed, the likelihood of—increasing the costs of gene-editing 
therapies using them if and when such therapies are marketed. By 
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conferring exclusive protection over a particular product—or in the 
case of vectors, a component of a larger product—patents give their 
owners the ability to charge supracompetitive prices.272 And while this 
may sound like more of an economic concern than an ethical one, 
prices for life-saving therapies like gene therapies tend to traffic on the 
bioethical principle of justice: at the most extreme, patients who cannot 
afford gene-editing therapies may die where more well-heeled 
sufferers would have otherwise lived.273 On a broader scale, this may 
contribute to increasing disparities in health outcomes between the rich 
and the poor.274 The vector pick-and-shovel play may, in time, come to 
be viewed as taking advantage of the ill just the same as Brannan took 
advantage of Sutter’s Fort miners. 
Private issues of justice notwithstanding, increased costs 
associated with the pick-and-shovel play have public concerns as well. 
Increased costs, all else being equal, decrease health-care payers’ 
bottom lines.275 Classical modeling would suggest this has one of two 
effects: either insurance premiums themselves become increasingly 
expensive, which in turn has the effect of limiting insurance coverage 
(and access to health care), especially among the most price sensitive 
of the population;276 or in the context of public payers, lead to health-
 
 272. Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. 
L. REV. 227, 236 (2012) (“Intellectual property .	.	. allows inventors or creators to charge 
supercompetitive prices during the period of exclusivity.”). 
 273. See Rebecca E. Wolitz, A Corporate Duty to Rescue: Biopharmaceutical Companies 
and Access to Medications, 94 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3186418 [https://perma.cc/G6T6-VBAG] (describing high 
drug prices as impinging on ethical duties). 
 274. See Michael Chernew et al., Effects of Increased Patient Cost Sharing on 
Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Care, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1131, 1131, 1135 
(2008). 
 275. This is assuming, of course, that payers will be forced to cover these new 
technologies but be unable to concomitantly raise premiums. The historical basis for this set 
of assumptions was weak in the early 2000s when premiums rose faster than expenditures. 
See J.D. Kleinke, The Price of Progress: Prescription Drugs in the Health Care Market, 20 
HEALTH AFF. 43, 48–49 (2001). But the recent development—and extraordinary cost—of 
new therapeutics may be beginning to change this analysis: payers feel increasingly unable 
to say “no” to even expensive genetic therapies, many of which are, after all, “cost 
effective.” The sudden sharp spike in costs for many therapies also means that payers 
cannot, in many instances, raise premiums in parallel. See Scott Gottlieb, Comm’r., FDA, 
Remarks at the Leonard Davis Institute Symposium, Harnessing the Curative Potential of 
Genomic Technologies (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Speeches/
ucm621964.htm [https://perma.cc/ST87-UFVJ]. 
 276. Michael Chernew, David M. Cutler & Patricia Seliger Keenan, Increasing Health 
Insurance Costs and the Decline in Insurance Coverage, 40 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1021, 1022, 
1034 (2005). 
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care rationing or severe strain on the public fisc—an even broader 
cataclysm of injustice.277 This latter fear is substantial: given Medicaid’s 
virtually mandatory coverage scheme, increased costs of even 
significant, life-saving therapies may dramatically fray public 
resources, forcing state Medicaid administrators to choose between 
advocating for a specific health-care intervention rather than, say, fully 
funding a year of kindergarten.278 
To be fair, the vector pick-and-shovel play’s contribution to this 
problem is the same as it is with patents, in general, for gene-editing 
therapies. But incompletely disclosed vector patents, as in the pick-
and-shovel play, present some particular nuances to this calculus. First, 
as necessary equipment to therapeutic gene-editing technology, vector 
patents have the ability to raise prices on end products (gene-editing 
therapies) even without disclosing which aspects of the technology they 
are covering. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to parcel out 
price assessments and figure out ways of saving money for gene 
therapies.279 Second, this phenomenon of multiple patentees covering 
a single product is likely to contribute to price increases in the form of 
“royalty stacking,” a well-studied, albeit controversial, aspect of 
product development.280 Assuming, without concluding, that royalty 
 
 277. See GRACE MARSDEN ET AL., INST. FOR CLINICAL & ECON. REVIEW, GENE 
THERAPY: UNDERSTANDING THE SCIENCE, ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE, AND PAYING 
FOR VALUE 7–8 (2017), https://icer-review.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/ICER-Gene-
Therapy-White-Paper-030317.pdf [https://perma.cc/JEA2-SX5M]. 
 278. See id.; Symposium, The Cost of a Cure: Creating Sustainable Solutions for Gene 
and Cell Therapies, University of Pennsylvania Leonard Davis Institute of Health 
Economics (Sept. 28, 2018) (conference attended by JSS and held under Chatham House 
rules). 
 279. That is, assuming that some vector technologies are substitutable prior to a given 
therapy’s design, gene-therapy developers would have the opportunity to price shop or 
negotiate among multiple, competing vector technologies—but only if there was 
transparency regarding the relationship between the vector license price and the technology 
implemented. Such transparency could be tied to disclosures of vector technologies in 
patents. But as detailed in this Article, such transparency doesn’t readily exist. 
 280. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl A. Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007) (defining “royalty stacking” as “situations in which a single 
product potentially infringes on many patents, and thus may bear multiple royalty burdens 
.	.	. reflect[ing] the fact that, from the perspective of the firm making the product in question, 
all of the different claims for royalties must be added or ‘stacked’ together to determine the 
total royalty burden borne by the product”). With this said, it is difficult to overstate how 
controversial the concept of “royalty stacking” has been in the patent economics literature; 
many well-regarded economists have disclaimed that such a phenomenon even exists. See, 
e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief 
for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714, 718–19 
(2008) (recounting that royalty stacking did not occur in the development of various wireless 
communications standards). 
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stacking is a true risk for vector patents in gene-therapy products, the 
pick-and-shovel play makes this harder to investigate even while it is 
unclear which layers of the stack they apply to.281 Lastly, the increased 
costs likely to come in the vector space bring with it the ethical issue of 
price transparency to patients and practitioners.282 While all patented 
therapeutics in the United States suffer from extreme price opacity, 
vector-implementing gene therapies arguably make the practice worse 
by adding an increased layer of technical opacity to an already dark 
field of business practice.283 The vector pick-and-shovel play may not 
be qualitatively different from patented drug pricing generally. But it 
certainly does not improve things. 
IV.  PICKS, SHOVELS, AND PATENT DISCLOSURE 
Gene editing, vectors, and patents seem to exist in a complicated 
interrelationship of advanced therapies, platform technology, 
disclosure, and secrecy. This may make it appear that the issues arising 
from gene-editing vector patents are limited if not unique. But in fact 
the case illuminates some broader issues about how patents work for 
cutting-edge and unpredictable technologies. First, the ethical 
problems centering on partial disclosure and secrecy suggest that there 
are other benefits to patent disclosure other than merely technical 
 
Perhaps the most serious criticism, however, comes from Einer Elhauge, who provides 
both an empirical and a theoretical denial of royalty stacking as a common occurrence. See 
generally Einer Elhauge, Do Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Lead to Systematically 
Excessive Royalties?, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 535 (2008). Elhauge’s criticism 
specifically takes the Lemley-Shapiro model to task for discounting the following “realistic 
assumptions: (i) that firms negotiate a series of patents when they make a multi-component 
product, (ii) that firms using the patents have information about their operations that patent 
holders lack[,] or (iii) that demand is not constant.” Id. at 537. Notably, for the purposes of 
vector patents and gene-editing developers, it appears that neither assumption (i) or (ii) 
applies and that assumption (iii)—given the extraordinary untapped demand for gene-
editing therapies—may, in fact, cut the other way. 
This is all to say: as controversial as royalty stacking is in the academic literature, the 
specific circumstances surrounding the vector patent pick-and-shovel play suggests that it 
may occur here. The degree to which it occurs and whether the ultimate prices for 
therapeutics using patented vector technology are “excessive” remain to be seen. The 
authors are neither clairvoyants nor economists; we don’t know. 
 281. See supra note 275 (regarding pricing and transparency). 
 282. See Narcyz Ghinea, Wendy Lipworth & Ian Kerridge, Propaganda or the Cost of 
Innovation? Challenging the High Price of New Drugs, 352 BRIT. MED. J., no. i1284, Mar. 
11, 2016, at 1, 2 (criticizing the link between high therapeutic costs and high development 
costs given that development costs are not transparent); Fintan R. Steele, Big Pharma’s 
Commedia, 123 CELL 971, 972 (2005) (noting therapeutic developers’ need for development 
cost transparency given drug prices). 
 283. See supra Section II.B. 
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ones—namely, that they serve as a form of consumer information. 
Second, it serves as a potentially instructive case study of factors that 
contribute to the cost of inventing around an operative but only 
partially disclosed and patented technology. Lastly, it suggests that 
poor disclosure in combination with commercialization may work as a 
form of standards lock-in—a channeling of inventive efforts around 
working with a widely adopted standard rather than developing better 
ones. Besides simply allowing others to “make and use” the underlying 
technology, the case of gene-editing vector patents may further teach 
us that there are a number of ancillary benefits to patent disclosure. 
This is not to say that patents are the sole culprit—or solution—to 
better disclosure on the road to informed consent. Regulators like the 
FDA play an enormous if not primary role in the quantity and quality 
of information disclosed about manufacturing inputs like gene-editing 
vectors for clinical trials.284 The FDA is, in many ways, an information 
disclosure agency; “today drug regulation guides the development of 
information that turns poisons, used advisedly, into drugs.”285 One can 
therefore certainly imagine a regime where the FDA is both statutorily 
authorized and administratively willing to mandate maximum 
disclosure regarding inputs for therapeutic manufacture. But that is 
purely imaginative. The FDA is both legally prohibited from requiring 
the disclosure of confidential business information from clinical trials 
and culturally unwilling to do so. This makes the role of disclosure for 
patents, however strong (or weak), all that much more important. 
A. Expanded Audiences for Patent Disclosure 
Patents have been classically described as a quid pro quo: the 
inventor receives exclusionary rights to the invention for the disclosure 
to the public of how the invention actually works.286 Requiring such 
disclosure allows the public to make use of the technology not just after 
the patent expires but immediately once the patent application is 
published by the USPTO.287 This allows others to test aspects of the 
invention, to attempt to build work-arounds to the patent, and to create 
 
 284. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 380–84 (2007) (discussing FDA’s role in information 
disclosure). 
 285. Id. at 347. 
 286. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 31, at 865 n.128 
(recounting the history of this phrase). 
 287. Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 1022; Seymore, supra note 35, at 624. 
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improvements.288 According to Timothy R. Holbrook, “the public 
benefits from the disclosure of the invention because the public 
storehouse of knowledge is thus enhanced, allowing others to rely upon 
the teachings of the patent to generate even further follow-on 
innovation.”289 
Despite these paeans to “the public,” the audience to which patent 
disclosures are directed tends to be limited. Most generously, patents 
are thought of as informing scientists and engineers in the technology’s 
field.290 This is implied by the statute, which requires patents’ 
disclosures to inform “persons having ordinary skill in the art.”291 And 
there is, in fact, some empirical evidence suggesting that researchers, 
at least in some fields, “read” or are at least aware of patents.292 More 
cynically, perhaps, disclosures only inform other patent professionals 
of patents in the field so they can either invent around or have their 
attorneys draft around them.293 
But the pick-and-shovel case for gene-editing vectors suggests that 
patent disclosures may be important for others—namely, consumers of 
patented technology.294 The lack of disclosure surrounding gene-
editing vector patents, and the ethical issues this raises, teaches that 
clinicians, doctors, and patients may benefit from more robust 
disclosure paradigms, even if only indirectly. Better patent disclosure 
allows these consumers to make better choices about whether, when, 
 
 288. Fromer, supra note 35, at 548–49; Seymore, supra note 35, at 624. 
 289. Holbrook, supra note 35, at 131. 
 290. See Anderson, supra note 36, at 1590 (“Disclosure has always been focused around 
the PHOSITA: the person having ordinary skill in the art.”); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do 
Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 545, 550–54 (2012) (reviewing 
the existence of this “generous” view in the literature). 
 291. 35 U.S.C. §	112(a) (2012). 
 292. See Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Who Reads Patents?, 35 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 
421, 421 (2017) (conducting, empirically, a survey assessment of scientists and engineers on 
whether and to what extent they derive useful information from patents); Ouellette, supra 
note 290, at 567–70 (surveying nanotechnology researchers). 
 293. Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 
72, 73–75, 86–88 (2012). 
 294. Cf. Anderson, supra note 36, at 1575 (“[A] patent can inform innovators, investors, 
and consumers about the value of an inventive idea.”); Devlin, supra note 36, at 425 
(“[Disclosures of patented] inventions are presumably of some worth to third parties as well, 
be they competitors, scientists, or consumers.”); Ghosh, supra note 36, at 337–38 (“[Patent] 
disclosures for consumers can become more meaningful and provide guidance in how to 
respond to identified disease proclivities and risk.”). To be clear, this refers to downstream, 
nontechnical users of the technology; it is not meant to refer to technical users of the 
patented technology stylized as consumers. See, e.g., Fromer, supra note 35, at 599 (“[A]s 
each patentee is also a consumer of innovation literature, he benefits from others’ better 
patent disclosures in his own research and development.”). 
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and how to use the patented technology. This is true even if consumers 
do not read the patent themselves and the disclosed information is only 
conveyed to them by others, like commercial users.295 In this way, 
patent disclosure can operate as an object of consumer efficiency akin 
to Clarisa Long’s model of patents as “signals,” giving consumers 
enough information about the underlying product to make informed 
choices about purchasing and use.296 This is analogous, perhaps, to the 
operation of trademarks as minimizing consumers’ search function 
with regard to quality, even if consumers know little about the guts of 
the mark-holders’ manufacturing process.297 Far from the technical 
notion of patent disclosure working simply to allow persons having 
ordinary skill in the art to replicate—that is, “make and use”—the 
technology, patent disclosure here informs consumers about the risks 
 
 295. See Anderson, supra note 36, at 1591 (“[T]here are numerous nonskilled audiences 
that a patent can reach. The dissemination of important information to a consumer may not 
allow the consumer to make the invention himself, but that is beside the point. The 
consumer may need to know other information before deciding to purchase a patented 
device: How much does the patented product cost? Does it work? Is it better than what 
came before? Is it technologically innovative? Very little of the information needed to make 
a purchasing decision will be contained in a patent. But the patent (even the very existence 
of the patent) may encourage a consumer to purchase, even though that information is not 
technical in nature.”). 
For this reason, one of the more typical solutions to information asymmetries—vertical 
integration—is unlikely to be effective. See Lee, supra note 159, at 1541–43 (discussing 
vertical integration arising from information asymmetries). To the contrary, vertical 
integration here is likely to exacerbate the problem of poor consumer disclosure. In such an 
instance, a firm—no longer required to demonstrate the novelty or significance of its 
technology to other businesses—could keep even more information secreted from 
downstream purchasers. 
 296. See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 677 (2002) (“The social 
benefit of patent signaling is the increase in market efficiency because of the existence of 
more information about the firm. .	.	. Without patents to provide a window (however hazy) 
into the firm, investors might carry out inefficient searches in pursuit of better information. 
When the two types of inefficiencies are netted out, the firm’s informational advantage may 
render excessive signaling by the firm preferable to excessive searches by investors.”). 
 297. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting 
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1225–27 (2007) (reviewing 
literature and cases supporting the notion that trademark law seeks to encourage “efficient 
resource allocation and bring consumers the highest quality products at the lowest prices”). 
At the same time, the search-costs theory of trademark has come under sustained attack. 
See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1840–41 (2007) (challenging the notion that diminished search costs 
and “improving the quality of information in the marketplace” are normatively appropriate 
moorings for trademark law). Whether search costs are indeed an appropriate touchstone 
for granting trademarks is an issue beyond the scope of this Article. At the same time, it 
may be interesting to think about the vector patent pick-and-shovel play as arising from an 
analogous connection between patent signals, poor patent disclosure, and shoddy marks. 
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and benefits of the technology they wish to use.298 Simply put, patent 
disclosure may not only serve as a manual but also as a label. 
B. Informing the Costs of Inventing Around 
Patent disclosure provides another benefit: it allows others to 
“invent around” the patented technology.299 By providing information 
about how the claimed technology actually works, users and 
commercial developers can assess how to adapt the technology to avoid 
infringement (and royalty payments).300 Far from being a nefarious 
practice, this is a core function of peripheral claiming in patent law.301 
At the same time, inventing around claimed technology may be 
more costly than simply obtaining a license to the sought-after 
technology.302 Patent disclosure, therefore, allows users to assess not 
only how to invent around particular technology but also the cost of 
doing so. There exists economics and patent law literature noting that 
the costs of inventing around a particular claimed invention increase as 
disclosure decays; it is hard to figure out how much it costs to get 
around a patented technology if it is hard to figure out how the 
technology works.303 But the inverse implication is likely true as well: 
 
 298. Cf. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 31, at 899 (linking 
irreproducible patent disclosure of drugs to issues concerning patient safety among others). 
 299. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
 300. Dan L. Burk, Perverse Innovation, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 24 (2016). But see 
Sichelman & Graham, supra note 37, at 135. 
 301. Burk, supra note 300, at 25 (“[F]ar from frustrating or eluding the intent of the 
patent, inventing around may be viewed as furthering important goals of the patent 
system.”). 
 302. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: PROMOTING INNOVATION AND COMPETITION 
61 (2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/antitrust-enforcement-
and-intellectual-property-rights-promoting-innovation-and-competition-report.s.department-
justice-and-federal-trade-commission/p040101promotinginnovationandcompetitionrpt0704.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WE9A-XDFK] (noting the tensions between licensing and design-around 
strategies); Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of 
Innovation Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1262 (2009) (“Professor Hovenkamp has explained 
that ‘too much [intellectual property] protection can produce costly monopolies or exclusive 
rights that others must either license or innovate around.’ This increases the costs of market 
entry and innovation, ultimately hurting both static and dynamic efficiency.” (alteration in 
original) (quoting HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE 
AND EXECUTION 249 (2005))); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patents and Growth: Empirical 
Evidence from the States, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1467, 1490 (2009) (“[If] it is less expensive to 
license than to invent around[,] .	.	. taking a license is individually rational.”). 
 303. See, e.g., Anokhin & Wincent, supra note 10, at 441 (“As long as the strength of the 
patent protection regime is a known quantity—which is generally believed to be the case—
the prospective entrepreneur may assign probabilities to the likelihood of a counterattack 
by the patent holder and/or estimate the chance of the endeavor[’s] success and take those 
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robust patent disclosure improves cost assessments of inventing around 
claimed technology.304 
Yet in some cases, even robust patent disclosure is not enough to 
induce users to invent around a particular technology—the relative 
costs are simply too high. In the case of gene-editing vectors, costs are 
high because there are other structural barriers to working around 
patented products—namely, FDA regulation and the highly 
experimental and uncertain nature of the technology itself.305 If a 
commercial developer needs FDA approval to commercially use a 
vector created in-house, and if the developer has to run costly and 
highly uncertain experiments to obtain that approval, that may be 
substantially more costly than simply obtaining a license to the 
technology from a company like Spark Therapeutics. Couple this with 
the fact that currently approved vectors actually “work” in the 
regulatory sense of the phrase, and the relative cost of inventing 
around becomes insurmountably high.306 Why spend money 
reinventing the wheel? 
What poor disclosure of gene-editing vector patents teaches is that 
poor patent disclosure, in tandem with structural barriers to 
commercial development, can operate to discourage others from 
inventing around even a troublesome, patented, but otherwise useful 
technology.307 Inventing and receiving approval for new vectors is 
 
probabilities into account when considering whether or not to pursue the respective 
opportunity.” (citation omitted)); Richard J. Gilbert, Patents, Sleeping Patents, and Entry 
Deterrence, 17 J. REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 205, 247 (1987) (“The patent grant does 
offer substantial protection when the cost of imitating the patented article is high. .	 .	 . In 
many cases the patent disclosure is grossly inadequate to enable firms to copy new 
technology.”); Seymore, supra note 35, at 654 n.172 (“[A] competitor can attempt to design 
around the invention or find flaws in the disclosure to invalidate it.”). 
 304. This is, to be clear, an intuition. There is little, if any, literature the authors could 
find assessing the merits of this argument. Empirical work—essentially, a survey asking 
firms that read patents whether disclosure has helped or hindered design-around efforts—
would be helpful to assess whether this phenomenon exists in the real world. 
 305. NASEM, HUMAN GENOME EDITING, supra note 29, at 103–07 (reviewing FDA 
issues concerning gene editing); Shim et al., supra note 9, at 746 (cataloging FDA regulatory 
hurdles); see also Anokhin & Wincent, supra note 10, at 440 (describing the difficulties in 
becoming the first mover in highly regulated fields). 
 306. That is, inventing around may not be successful in the sense that the design-around 
vector may affect the therapeutic end product in such a way as to fail FDA approval. In that 
circumstance, the therapeutic developer is faced with bearing the cost of designing around 
the patented vector, but with no marketable product to show for its efforts. Such costs are 
almost certainly more than the cost of licensing a regulatorily “proven” technology. 
 307. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, The Generic Biologics Debate: Industry’s Unintended 
Admission that Biotech Patents Fail Enablement, 11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 21–24 (2006) 
(describing this for biosimilars in the context of nonenablement). 
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fraught and expensive.308 Whether this is enough to truly prevent those 
wishing to invent around the patent remains to be seen—it is an 
empirical question worthy of a separate investigation.309 Poor patent 
disclosure, however, makes this assessment incredibly difficult. And 
without better information about how much inventing around actually 
costs, developers’ appetite for inventing around patented vectors is 
likely to be diminished. The case with gene-editing vector patents 
teaches that another virtue of patent disclosure—even when there are 
commercial embodiments available—is a more accurate assessment of 
how much it would cost to avoid them. 
C. Channeling Therapies and Platform Standardization 
Generally, patent disclosure is an integral part of standard 
setting—an industry’s agreement of common standards or components 
for a broader, complex technology.310 For standard-setting 
organizations—the collective, often ad-hoc entities that oversee the 
standard-setting process—technical standards are adopted by users 
and downstream developers en masse.311 Where certain developers own 
smaller pieces of the standard set to be adopted, patents serve as one 
instrument for each participant to disclose their particular contribution 
to the standard.312 Because standards often prove sticky—it is difficult, 
for example, to require hardware manufacturers to remove USB ports 
from their wares after the USB standard has been adopted—patent 
holders often commit to contributing their intellectual property 
through fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory licensing.313 
This well-worn process turns, however, on the robustness of 
patents’ technical disclosure; with poor disclosure, it may be difficult, 
if not impossible, to determine whether patents committed to a 
standard actually practice it or not.314 This is a routine if not common 
 
 308. See, e.g., Ricki Lewis, What Should Gene Therapy Cost?, PLOS BLOGS (Oct. 26, 
2017), https://blogs.plos.org/dnascience/2017/10/26/what-should-gene-therapy-cost/ 
[https://perma.cc/964T-VAU4] (“Luxturna was in clinical trials for 9 years, and that’s 
expensive. Developing the vector alone can cost $500,000 to $1 million.”). 
 309. See supra note 306. 
 310. Jorge L. Contreras, Essentiality and Standards-Essential Patents, in CAMBRIDGE 
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND 
PATENTS 209, 209–10 (Jorge L. Contreras ed., 2017). 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Contreras, Much Ado, supra note 38, at 2.  
 314. See, e.g., Anne Layne-Farrar, Moving Past the SEP RAND Obsession: Some 
Thoughts on the Economic Implications of Unilateral Commitments and the Complexities of 
Patent Licensing, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1093, 1102 n.31 (2014) (“[E]ven after a standard 
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problem for electronics and software standards where more patents are 
frequently tied up in standards than readily necessary.315 In those 
industries, however, technical operability of the underlying technology 
is rarely an issue; the role of standard-setting organizations is to ensure, 
among other things, that users can practice standard technologies even 
if the patents claimed to be covering them are indeterminate. But there 
are no such standard-setting organizations, at least to date, for gene-
editing vectors. The gene-editing vector patent cases described here, 
therefore, begin to clarify what happens when a certain component 
technology becomes standard but only poorly discloses how it 
operates. Poor disclosure means that a standard may be adopted that 
is otherwise technically suboptimal, unsafe, or not universally 
applicable.316 
In addition, the gene-editing vector patents suggest that 
standardization in the shadow of poor patent disclosure may result in 
what we call “channeling”: the continued development of downstream 
technology using a previously adopted standard simply because it’s 
available.317 In the gene-editing patent context, this means the selection 
of certain gene-editing therapies for development not because they 
have the strongest health impact but because they work with off-the-
shelf vectors.318 This risks exacerbating some of the potential inequities 
already brewing for gene therapy: that the therapies developed will 
largely be directed to genetic disorders afflicting wealthy, developed 
countries and sold for high prices.319 In other cases, there is the risk that 
treatment for some diseases may lag behind because the underlying 
vector technology—vectors’ picks and shovels—has not been robustly 
investigated. 
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To be fair, in some instances channeling is less problematic. There 
are few issues with channeling in the information technology space, and 
indeed there are some instances in that industry where channeling has 
actually produced resounding successes.320 But for gene editing and 
other advanced therapies, channeling gives cause for concern. 
Choosing diseases for therapeutic development has public health 
concerns that extend beyond mere market efficiencies. Better patent 
disclosure—knowing vectors’ manufacturing and applicability 
details—would go a long way. The tail shouldn’t wag the dog. 
CONCLUSION 
If gene editing is a modern-day gold rush, there’s still a lot of 
money to be made in picks and shovels—the vectors used to get gene 
editors’ molecular equipment into cells. Companies like uniQure, 
MaxCyte, and Spark Therapeutics are beginning to market vector 
“platforms” to more high-profile gene-editing companies. And in 
doing so, these vector companies have relied on both patents and 
secrecy: patents covering their technologies that fail to entirely disclose 
how they work. Just like the pick-and-shovel business during the 1848 
Gold Rush, this is a form of informational arbitrage: if everyone knew 
exactly how the patented vectors worked, they would develop their 
own. 
And yet, this strategy—good for oil and gas storage, bulk 
chemicals, or cloud computing services—raises some difficult 
bioethical issues when applied to experimental and potentially unsafe 
therapies. It makes uncertain the risk of experimental therapies using 
the vectors, lulling patients and clinical research subjects into a false 
sense of security. This is exacerbated by the scant patent disclosures 
made by vector developers that are often rooted in insufficient 
preclinical evidence. Patient autonomy is also impeded because 
secrecy, when combined with gene editing’s hype, makes true informed 
consent difficult to obtain. And patents covering vectors, even when 
only partially disclosed, are likely to contribute to the already 
astronomical costs of gene therapies. Selling picks and shovels in a gold 
rush may be good business strategy, but when the miners are the ill and 
the desperate, it may simply be predation. 
At the same time, the issues surrounding gene-editing vector 
patents also serve as a case study for patent policymakers on why 
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robust patent disclosure is important. Patent disclosure informs not just 
users and technical developers of the technology but also consumers. 
It also clues in downstream developers—like gene-editing 
companies—on the costs of inventing around a technology, if needed. 
And lastly, patent disclosure polices against uncharacterized 
technologies becoming standardized—the “channeling” of future 
development around nuts and bolts that are not well understood. Just 
like the Gold Rush of 1848, more information about where to find good 
picks and shovels checks against the hype then displayed by Sam 
Brannan in that May in San Francisco: 
“GOLD! GOLD! GOLD! From the American River!”321 
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